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Beverly and Blystone: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. ELECTIONS IN LIMITED PURPOSE DISTRICTS: THE
CONTINUING VITALITY OF SAL YER LAND
COMPANY
A.

INTRODUCTION

In James v. BallI the Ninth Circuit found unconstitutional
certain Arizona statutes which mandated that voting in elections
for directors of the Salt River Project Agricultural and Improvement and Power District (the District) was limited to landowners, with votes apportioned according to owned acreage. 2 James
focused on an interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 3
and may be viewed as narrowing the scope of that decision.
Under the Reclamation Act of 1902,4 the federal government and the State of Arizona formed a joint project in the Salt
River Valley for the storage and distribution of water. The Salt
River Valley Waters Users' Association (the Association) was
created to finance the construction of project facilities. Only
landowners within the District could belong to the Association.
The obligations of the Association were tr~smuted in prorata
liens on the lands of Association members. The District was
formed in 1937 when the costs of financing project facilities became overly burdensome for the Association. In exchange for title to project facilities, the District agreed to provide whatever
capital and operating funds the Association needed to operate
project facilities. Pursuant to the agreement, the District also
agreed to operate project water storage and distribution facilities. In order to generate revenue to offset the costs of providing
water, the District produces electricity and today is Arizona's
1. 613 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Choy, the other panel members were Kennedy,
J., and Hall, D.J., sitting by designation, dissenting).
2. [d. at 181.
3. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See notes 27-42 infra and accompanying text.
4. Act of June 17,1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 3711457 (1976».
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second largest utility.
The District is divided into ten electoral subdivisions. Each
subdivision elects one director and three council members. The
president and vice-president of the district are elected at-large.
Qualified electors may vote for these offices according to the
amount of land they own in the District. Two at-large directors
are elected in addition to the other directors and officers.II The
twelve-member Board of Directors and the thirty-member
Council administer the District.

B.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

The Constitution does not specifically guarantee the right to
vote in state elections, but the Supreme Court has held that
once a state grants that right, all infringements upon it must be
subjected to the requirements of the equal protection clause.6 In
Gray v. Sanders,? the Supreme Court held that one person's voting power could not be greater than that of another in a statewide legislative election merely because of the location of his
residence. In Wesberry v. Sanders,s the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the Constitution protects the right
to vote. In the seminal decision of Reynolds v. Sims, 9 the Court
held that a person's right to vote is unconstitutionally impaired
when the weight of the citizen's vote is made to depend on
where he lives. The "one person-one vote" standard has its roots
in the Court's statement in Reynolds that "the Equal Protection
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislatures, as
nearly of equal population as is practicable."lo Since Reynolds,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked and enlarged the one
person-one vote principle.
5. 613 F.2d at 239. This number became four in 1980. These at-large directors are
elected on a per-person voting basis rather than having the votes apportioned according
to owned acreage.
6. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1965). See generally 25
AM. JUR. 2d Elections §§ 53·57 (1966).
.
7. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
8. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10. ld. at 536. The "one person-one vote" terminology arose in Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. at 381. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 1511 was the first
case to require the invocation of strict scrutiny when examining
infringement on the voting franchise. Kramer involved a challenge to a section of the New York Education Code l2 which provided that voters, otherwise qualified to vote in state and federal
elections, could not vote in certain school district elections unless they (1) owned or leased taxable real property within the
district, or (2) were parents or guardians of children enrolled in
the local public schools. Plaintiff was denied his application to
vote because he did not own or Jease any property within the
district and had no children.
In finding the statute unconstitutional~ the Kramer Court
recognized the fundamental nature of the right to vote, any impairment of which must be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized."13 Thus, any state statute that grants the right to vote to
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies it to others must be examined to determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.14
Moreover, the need for strict scrutiny is not affected because the
district meetings and the school board do not have general legislative powers. lIS Strict scrutiny is "not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident
citizens are permitted to participate and some are not."IB

The school district asserted that there was a compelling
state interest in restricting the franchise to those members of
the community" 'primarily interested in such elections.' "l7 The
Court, however, bypassed this issue and went directly to the second half of the equal protection inquiry- whether the statute
was necessary to promote the assertedly compelling state interest. IS The Court ultimately determined that because the law permitted the inclusion of many persons having only a "remote and
11.
12.
13.
14.

395 U.S. 621 (1969).
N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 2012 (McKinney).
395 U.S. at 626 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 562).
ld. at 627 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965».
15. ld. at 629.
16. ld. (emphasis added).
17. ld. at 631 (quoting Brief for Appellee).
18. See id. at 632 n.14. The court stated that if it found the exclusions necessary to
promote the articulated state interest, it would then have to determine whether the interest promoted by limiting the franchise was a compelling state interest.
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indirect interest in school affiars" while disenfranchising others
having a "distinct and direct interest in ... school meeting decisions,"19 the section was not sufficiently tailored to limiting the
vote to those "primarily interested" in school affairs to justify
the denial of the franchise to plaintiff.20
The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny in' several
challenges to limitations of. the right to vote.21 In Cipriano v.
City of Houma,22 the Court held that a statute which provided
that a municipal utility could issue revenue bonds only upon approval of a majority of the voters in an election in which only
qualified property taxpayers were permitted to vote, violated the
equal protection clause. In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,28 the Court
relied upon Cipriano iJrl invalidating property ownership requirements in elections approving issuance of general obligation
bonds. In Hill v. Stone,2f. the Court found that provisions of the
state constitution, state election code, and city charter which
limited the right to vote in city bond elections to those persons
having "rendered" property (listed with the tax assessor-collector either real, mixed, or personal property for taxation in the
election district)25 fell far short of meeting the compelling state
interest test consistently applied in Kramer, Cipriano, and
Phoenix. 26
Recently, in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District2'1 anel Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,26
the Supreme Court carved out two exceptions to the rule that
strict scrutiny should be applied when examining limitations
19. [d. at 632.

20. [d. at 633. The Court rejected the School District's argument that the legislature
was the proper body to balance the interest of the community in the maintenance of

orderly school district elections against the interest of the individual in voting in such
elections.
21. See, e.g., Hill v. Stolle, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
22. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
23. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
24. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
25. [d. at 291 n.l. Under the statutes rendering even a very small amount of property qualified the person to "ote. [d. at 299.
26. [d. at 301.
27. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (decided the same day as Salyer).
28. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
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upon the fundamental right to vote. Salyer resolved the question left open to Kramer-whether states could limit voting to
those primarily interested in an election.29 Defendant Tulare
Water District (the TWD) in Salyer was created for the acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, conservation, and distribution of water for the ultimate benefit of farm land within the
District.30 The TWD was governed by a board of directors. Only
landowners could vote in elections for the board and votes were
apportioned according to the assessed valuation of their land.
The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist determined that,
because the TWD had a special limited purpose and due to the
disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group,
the TWD fell within an exception to the one person-one vote
principle of Reynolds. 31 Justice Rehnquist relied on Avery v.
Midland County S2 which had intimated that a state could elect
certain functionaries who perform duties so far removed from
normal governmental activities and affecting certain groups so
disproportionately that the one person-one vote principle need
not apply.3s
In Holt, defendant City of Tuscaloosa had extended the exercise of its municipal powers over citizens of surrounding communities including those of the City of Holt. State statutes allowed the city to exercise police and sanitary regulations,
criminal jurisdiction of the city's court and the power to license
businesses, trades and professions, all within a three-mile radius
of the city limits. Plaintiff Holt Civil Club alleged a denial of
due process and equal protection because citizens of Holt were
not allowed to vote in Tuscaloosa municipal elections.
In the opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court refused to
apply strict scrutiny and distinguished the Kramer-CiprianoPhoenix line of .cases. Justice Rehnquist insisted that the holdings in those cases were predicated upon denial of the right to
29. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. IS, 395 U.S. at 631.
30. 410 U.S. at 723.
31. Id. at 728.
32. 390 U.S. 477 (1968).
33. 397 U.S. at 56. Justice Rehnquist failed to reconcile this conclusion with the
language in Kramer that an entity's lack of general governmental powers did not affect
the need for "close judicial examination." Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. IS, 395
U.S. at 629.
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vote to individuals "physically resident within the geographic
boundaries of the governmental entity concerned."s4 Since Tuscaloosa denied the franchise only to those living outside. its corporate limits, a mere rational basis scrutinty was required.slI Indeed, the Court's inquiry was limited to the question of whether
"any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the
statute.ss This standard was easily met by finding that the state
legislature could have determined that cities need a certain degree of control over activities just beyond their borders.S7 Moreover, the legislature could legitimately determine that municipalities should have some control over activities conducted
within their police jurisdiction.ss
Both Salyer and Holt ignored traditional equal protection
analysis. Normally, strict scrutiny is triggered when either a fundamental right or a suspect classification is involved.s9 Strict
scrutiny requires that the statutory classification be necessary to
promote a compelling state interest.40 Thus, as in Kramer, strict
scrutiny should first be applied because of the fundamental nature of the right to vote. Then the interests of the otherwise
qualified, but excluded, voters must be examined to determine if
the statutory disenfranchisement is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. Salyer and Holt reversed the analysis.
These cases initially examined the interest of the excluded voters to determine if strict scrutiny applied in the first instance. In
both opinions, Justice Rehnquist concluded that mere rational
basis scrutiny was appropriate.41
34. 439 u.s. at 68.
35. [d. at 74.
36. [d. (emphasis added) (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. at 732). By embracing the "any conceivable basis" test Justice
Rehnquist reversed the modem trend of the Supreme Court by reverting to the extremely deferential standard of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911). Recent cases applying rational basis scrutiny have demanded a more exacting
standard and have refused to manufacture imaginative justifications for the asserted
state interest. Ct. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973) (requiring that the challenged distinction rationally further some legitimate, articulated state purpose). See
generally Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. 439 U.S. at 74.
38. [d.
39. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
40. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634.
41. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. at 70; Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. at 728-30.
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Salyer and Holt may be viewed as narrow exceptions to the
principles established in the Kramer-Cipriano-Phoenix line of
cases. Nonetheless, at least one commentator perceives them as
a shift in the Court's position on equal protection.42
C.

THE

James v. Ball

ANALYSIS

In James the Ninth Circuit attempted to determine the correct interpretation of Salyer. Ostensibly for a proper explication
of the rationale behind its James decision, the majority undertook a dissection of Salyer. The majority noted first that the
sole means of meeting the expenses of the Tulare Water District
was through assessments against landowners; thus landowners as
a class bore the entire financial burden. Second, the TWD existed solely in order to procure water for farming the agricultural
lands of the district. Third, while the TWD had power to engage
in flood control activities, "the Court found these powers were
incident to the exercise of its primary functions of water storage
and distribution." Finally, the TWD did not provide those services typical of other general public services "such as schools,
housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the
type ordinarily financed by a municipal body."43

The situation in James is very different from that in Salyer.
The majority reasoned that although the Salt River District
once bore some similarities to the district in Salyer, the present
reach and effect of the District's operations upon all of the residents of Arizona were far more extensive than those of the
TWD in Salyer. 44 For example, the District is the second largest
utility in Arizona, servicing nearly a quarter of a million persons,
with many and diverse activities. In addition, the majority found
that the water operations of the District were significantly more
diverse than those in Salyer.4fS The District provides water to
42. Note, Voting Rights and Extraterritorial Municipal Powers in Light of Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1085 (1979). But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAw 765 (1978) ("Salyer • •• should be treated as a narrowly limited exception to a powerful general principle that interest-based restrictions are constitutionally disfavored. ").
43. 613 F.2d at 183 (citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 440 U.S. at 728-29).
44. Id. Thus at some point along the continuum between the factual setting of
James and that of Salyer the constitutional prerequisites of the one person-one vote
principle of Reynolds is no longer applicable.
45. Id.
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major portions of Phoenix, twenty-five percent of its total capacity going to municipal uses and an additional fifteen percent for
nonagricultural uses. ,]~he inexorable consequence of the diversity of the District was the conclusion by the majority that the
District could not be -characterized as having a special limited
purpose such as in Salyer. 46
Addressing the other half of the Salyer test-whether the
District's activities disproportionately affected landowners-the
majority concluded that they did not.47 Almost forty percent of
the District's water is purchased and consumed in a manner unrelated to agriculture and land ownership. Ninety-eight percent
of the District's revenues are produced by its electric utility operations.48 The District in James is therefore fundamentally different from the TWD in Salyer, the majority reasoned, because
"the financial burden of operating the District does not fall entirely or even primarily on landowners; it falls instead on the
purchasers of electricity."49
In his dissent, District Judge Peirson M. Hall attacked the
majority's conclusions as to the special limited purpose of the
District, and its disproportionate affect upon landowners. Initially, however, Judge Hall concluded that only the first half of
the Salyer test-the performance of traditional general governmental functions-was necessary to finding that the Salyer exception applies.150 This conclusion stemmed from language in
Hadley v. Junior College District,151 upon which Salyer relied,
stating in the conjunctive that the possession of vital and traditional governmental powers which had an effect throughout the
district as well as disproportionate effect upon different groups,
appeared to be prerequisites to the application of strict equal
protection requiremellts, not to the availability of an exception
46. Id. at 183-84.
47. Id. at 184. The majority quoted dictum from Cipriano noting that the operations of gas, water, and electric utility 8ystems affect virtually every citizen of a city. 395
U.S. at 705. It would therefore be doubtful that any established utility could fall within
the Salyer exception because one of Salyer'S requirements is a small effect upon the
general electorate. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728-30.
48. 613 F.2d at 184.
49. [d. (emphasis added).
50. [d. at 190.
51. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
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from them. 52
The dissent reasoned that the District does not perform
traditional general governmental functions because the Arizona
legislature has defined the District's purpose as "securing water
necessary to improve agricultural land."lIs Moreover, the District's powers are incidental to its primary purpose of water control. M Such a limited role as this does not demonstrate an exercise of general governmental powers. 511 Indeed the dissent would
52. ld. at 53-54, 56.
53. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANNOT. § 45-903 that provides:
A. When five or more holders of title or evidence of title
to agricultural lands which have at any time been recognized
as within the exterior boundaries of a United States reclamation project and which are susceptible of irrigation by the
same general system of irrigation works, desire to provide for
the improvement of such lands, they may propose the organization of an agricultural improvement district under the provisions of this chapter for any of the following purposes:
1. To secure all or a portion of the water necessary to irrigate the lands, or any part thereof, or to increase or secure
additional water therefor.
2. To provide for the storage, regulation, control or distribution of all or any part of the water already available or for
an additional or increased water supply available or to become
available for the irrigation of all or a portion of the lands.
3. To provide for the development of additional water for
the irrigation of all or a portion of the lands.
4. To provide for the drainage of all or a part of the lands.
5. To increase, enlarge or extend, operate and maintain
any irrigation or drainage works already in existence and
available for the irrigation or drainage of all or a part of the
lands.
6. To provide new or additional means for the irrigation
or drainage of all or a part of the lands or to provide power or
a means of communication for the use of the owners or occupants of the lands.
7. To reduce the cost of irrigation, drainage and power to
the owners of the lands in the district by the sale of surplus
water or power produced, owned or controlled by the district,
and the construction, maintenance, extension, replacement,
financing and refinancing of the works useful for such purpose.
8. To finance or refinance as its own obligation all or a
part of a debt incurred or proposed to be incurred by a public
or private agency in the construction, maintenance, improvement or replacement of the structures and equipment necessary or useful for the accomplishment of any of the purposes
set forth in this section.
54. 613 F.2d at 190.
55.ld.
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regard the authority to develop and sell electrical power as preempted by the more basic need for water. liS
The majority addressed the dissent's concern by noting that
the District is not a private company, so the District should not
be compared with a private company where only shareholders-here, landowners-may vote. On the contrary, the District
is a public entity, being a political subdivision of the State of
Arizona with the legal status of a municipality.1I7 In addition, the
level of the District operations "simply does not permit the interpretation that the electric utility is a side venture that the
District dabbles in to pick up a little extra money in order to
benefit the landowners. "118 Moreover, the majority stated that
the District's electrical operations had taken on independent significance, and it would "elevate form over substance to characterize the District as functioning solely for the benefit of
landowners."lIs
The dissent next asserted that, although certain municipalities provide water and electrical services, these functions are not
traditionally governmental services.so In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company,61 the Supreme Court stated that supplying utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state and is not traditionally associated with sovereignty.8s
The dissent insisted that even if the District is compared to vital
governmental services, it is not a utility. The District is not
owned by the public, but by private landowners. Since the
"profits from the salo of electricity are used to defray the expense in irrigating th.ese private lands for personal profit" the
dissent asserted that the District did not function to " 'serve the
whole people' but rather operates for the benefit of these 'inhabitants of the district' who are private owners."ss Therefore, the
Salyer exception should apply, and not the one person-one vote
56. [d. at 186.
57. [d. at 184.
58. [d.
59. [d.
60. [d. at 190.
61. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
854 n.18 (1976).
62. 419 U.S. at 353.
63. 613 F.2d at 190 (quoting Local 266 v. Salt River Project Agricultural and Improvement Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 44, 275 P.2d 393, 403 (1954».
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standard of Reynolds.
The James majority successfully rebutted Judge Hall's rationale. It pointed out that the issue in James is altogether different from the issue in Jackson. 64 Jackson involved a determination of whether the actions of a private utility were so closely
regulated by the state that its actions could fairly be treated as
that of the state itself. The Salyer court assumed state action
and went on to deal directly with the issue of whether the requirements of the fourteenth amendment were applicable. In
James, the majority framed the issue as "not whether the Salt
River District is a state entity, but whether, having made the
decision to create the entity and provide for the election of its
directors, the state can deny the electoral franchise to citizens
whose economic interest and natural environment are vitally affected by the entity's operations. "86
The majority further asserted that in a factual setting similar to James or Salyer, the Salyer opinion suggests an electric
utility is governmental in nature.88 The Supreme Court found
support for its conclusion that the Tulare District did not perform general governmental functions from the facts that the district there did not provide" 'other general public services such
as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything
else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.' "8'1 The
James majority reinforced this theory with the Court's opinion
in Cipriano where a municipal utility serviced so large a percentage of the people in the city that the Court refused to limit
elections called to approve the issuance of bonds by the utility
to landowners.68 The James majority concluded that the District's electrical operations are so substantial in scope and so
closely interwoven with the water delivery functions of the District that the special limited purpose exception of Salyer did
not apply.69
64. 613 F.2d at 184.
65. ld. at 184·85.
66. ld. at 125. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
67. ld. (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
at 728-29).
68. 613 F.2d at 185. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
69. 613 F.2d at 185.
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The dissent attempted to strengthen its conclusion that the
Salyer exception applied through an examination of the disproportionate impact of the District's activities upon District landowners. It asserted that both the legislative purpose and practical effect of the District's activities disproportionately concern
the landowners.'70 This effect happens in two ways. First, the sale
of electrical power to pl3rsons outside the District in essence subsidizes the water delivery functions of the District. If the profit
from the electric power sales is viewed as income to the District
landowners, the District's purpose to benefit landowners is highlighted.'71 Second, financial reverses of the District fall disproportionately upon landowners. Arizona Revised Statute section
45-1047(A) provides that District bonds may create liens upon
the real property within the District.'72 Moreover, state law provides for raising District revenue by taxation of District landowners.'73 Accordingly, the dissent found that the liabilities of
the District fall disproportionately upon District landowners.'74
The majority attacked the legal assumption that "disproportionate representation may be used to prevent electors who
have a direct and substantial interest in a government entity's
70. Id. at 190.
n. Id. at 191.
72. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANNOT. § 45-1047(A) provides iD full:
All bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be
a lien upon the real property included in the district, and such
bonds and the interest thereon shall be payable from the levy
of taxes upon the real property included in the district. All the
real property in the district shall be and remain liable to taxation for such payments, but whenever any such bonds are additionally secured by.a pledge of the income, revenue and receipts of the district as provided in this chapter, the board
shall abate and lovy of any tax herein required for the current
year in which the income, revenue and receipts to be received
by the district, or on hand for that purpose, will be sufficient
to make the principal and interest payments due upon such
bonds.
73. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANNOT. § 45-1014(B) provides in full:
B. The board of supervisors shall levy against such landowner
in the district a tax equal to the unit rate multiplied by the
number of acres owned, and certified by the board of directors
of the district to the board of supervisors. The board of directors, in certifying the annual estimate to the board of supervisors, shall include a list of landowners in the district and the
number of acres owned by each.
74. 613 F.2d 191.
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operations from out-voting certain other electors who own land
that constitutes part of the security for the entity's financial
structure. "'15 The majority stated that there is no legal support
for the implicit rationale that disproportionate. electoral representation may serve as a safety device to protect the property
interests or expectations of landowners.'16 The Salyer exception
applies for an altogether different reason; "under conditions, of
most narrow dimension, there may exist a state-created entity,
limited to operations with little effect on' the general electorate
and a substantially disproportionate effect on the interests of a
discrete group permitted to vote."'1'1 If, as in James, the operations of a state entity affect a diverse group of citizens, the right
to vote may not exclude those who have an interest in the
election.'18
D.

CONCLUSION

The courts have two options in cases where the issue is application of the special limited purpose exception of Salyer. On
the one hand, a court may perform a straightforward analysis
based upon the factors enumerated in Salyer-possession of
general governmental powers and disproportionate affect upon a
discrete group. If these factors are found to exist, the court may
find that the application of the Salyer doctrine is appropriate.
On the other hand, the court may pay lip service to the inherently unsound rationale of Salyer by articulating the Salyer
factors. Once it is found that the Salyer exception does not apply, the court should reach the more substantial equal protection issues posed by Kramer and its progeny. Only if the statutory scheme is found to be' necessary to effectuating a
compelling state interest must it be held constitutional.
. In light of the fluctuating state of equal protection analysis
being performed by the Supreme Court in voting rights cases, it
is difficult to predict the outcome of any particular case. The
75. [d. at 185.
76. [d.
77. [d. (citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
at 728-30). The language chosen by the Ninth Circuit limiting the Salyer exception to
conditions "of most narrow dimension" indicates the court's desire to give Salyer a very
restricted interpretation, if not to limit it to its facts.
78. 613 F.2d at 242.
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latter approach articulated above offers lower courts the flexibility required to satisfy the competing interests of (1) adherence to Supreme Court precedent, and (2) performing a strict
equal protection analysilJ when faced with infringement of a fundamental right.
The James court lJatisfied the duty of adherence to Supreme Court precedent by choosing to decide the case through a
straightforward analysis of Salyer. The ultimate result in James
appears to be correct because under an application of strict scrutiny it is doubtful that the statutory scheme would be found
necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest. In consonance with the close jud.icial examination warranted when examining infringements upon a fundamental right, however, a better
approach would have been to reach the same result as the James
court did by first finding Salyer inapplicable and then performing a strict equal protection analysis.

Brian Beverly*

II. EQUAL PROTEC'rION - "STACKED DECK" AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Associated General Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School District,l the Ninth Circuit upheld a challenge to a
San Francisco Board -of Education's affirmative action policy,
thus prohibiting the San Francisco Unified School District
(School District) from ,engaging in a voluntary affirmative action
program with respect to the hiring of school district construction
contractors.

Under the policy, bidders for School District construction
jobs were required to be either minority general contractors or
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. 616 F.2d 1381 (9th eir. 1980), rehearing denied, Feb. 22 and April 25, 1980 (per
Choy, C. J.; the other panel members were Hug, J. and Richey, D. J., sitting by
designation).
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to employ minority subcontractors for twenty-five percent in
dollar volume of the contracted work. 2 Noncomplying bidders
were declared not "responsible bidders"3 under California Education Code section 39640," which requires the school districts to
award construction contracts to the "lowest responsible bidder."6 Associated General Contractors, Inc. challenged the policy
and the district court enjoined the School District from enforcing it, "on the ground that 'responsibility' under the state law
referred only to a building contractor's financial and physical
ability to do the work."s
At approximately the same time as the district court issued
an injunction the School District was awarded eight million dollars in public works funds under the Public Works Employment
Act of 19777 (PWEA). Section 6705(f)(2) of the PWEA requires
an applicant to give "satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that
at least ten per centum of the amount of each grant shall be
expended for 'minority business enterprises.'''8 Subsequently,
the Board enacted another policy substantially similar to the
first. The second policy provided for twenty-five percent expenditures on minority contractors instead of the ten percent required by the PWEA and applied only to projects financed by
2. 616 F.2d at 1381.
3.ld.
4. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39640 (West 1978) (formerly CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15951).
5.ld.
6. 616 F.2d at 1383. The district court also prohibited the School District from
awarding contracts to other than the lowest responsible bidder merely because the lower
bidder was of the wrong parentage and refused to accede to the School District's views
on socially desirable subcontracting. Associated General Contractors v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 431 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (Supp. I 1977).
8. ld. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(£)(2) provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise,
no grant shall be made under this chapter for any local public
works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance
to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of
each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "minority
business enterprise" means a business at least 50 per centum
of which is owned' by minority group members or, in case of a
publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of
which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes
of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
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the PWEA. Associated General Contractors, Inc. then applied
for a contempt order to vindicate the earlier injunction. The district court dismissed the proceeding but issued an order reducing the twenty-five percent quota under the policy to the ten
percent minimum required under the PWEA and modified its
previous injunction so as not to prohibit the new policy~ 9
B.

THE DECISION

The Ninth Circuit considered four major arguments before
deciding that the affirmative action policy was impermissible
under the law of California. First, the court determined that the
authority of the Board was derived from California Education
Code section 3516010 which limits the authority of the school
board by prohibiting conflicts with other state laws.l1 The court
found that California's "low bid law" for school district contracts, California Education Code section 39640,12 conflicted
with the Board's affirmative action policy.lS Therefore, the policy was found not to be within the authority of the Board.I " Second, apparently creating new· terminology, the court labelled
quota and "positive-factor" type affirmative action programs
"stacked deck" programs.lI~ The court found there was no affirmative constitutional duty to engage in "stacked deck" affirmative
action. 16 Third, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no affirmative duty under the California Constitution to engage in
"stacked deck" affirmative action programs.17 Fourth, the court
decided that even though the California low bid law prohibited
the affirmative action policy, it was not unconstitutional as
applied. ls
C.

THE STATE LAW CONFLICT

The San Francisco School District drew its authority from
9. 616 F.2d at 1383.
10. [d. at 1384. For the full text of CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160 (West 1978) see note 19

infra.
11. 616 F.2d at 1384.
12. For the full text of C}.L. EDUC. CODE § 39640, see note 21 infra.
13. 616 F.2d at 1385.
14. [d.

15. [d. at 1386. See text accompanying notes 29-35 infra.
16. [d.

17. [d. at 1388.
18. [d. at 1390-91.
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California Education Code section 35160 which provides that
"the governing board of any school district may initiate and
carry on any program. . . which is not in conflict with or inconsistent with ... any laW."19 This is a broad, but limited, grant
of power to school districts to engage in appropriate activities.
The Ninth Circuit found a basic conflict between the policy
adopted by the Board and section 39640,20 which states "[t]he
governing board of any school district shall let any contract. • .
to the lowest responsible bidder who shall give such security as
the board requires, or else reject all bids."21
Relying primarily upon Inglewood-Los Angeles County
Civic Center Authority v. Superior Court,22 the Ninth Circuit
found that the power conferred by section 35160 was inconsistent with state court interpretations of California low bid law.28
Inglewood involved a contract for construction of the City of
Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center. Under California
Government Code section 25454,24 the contract was to be
awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder." Insofar as it requires contracts to be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder," section 25454 is similar to section 39640. The Inglewood
19. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 35160 (West 1978). Section 35160 states in full:
On and after January I, 1976, the governing board of any
school district may initiate and carry on any program, activity,
or may otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict
with or inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and which
is not in conflict with the purposes for which school districts
are established.
20. 616 F.2d at 1385.
21. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 39640 (West 1978) (emphasis added). Section 39640 states in
full:

The governing board of any school district shall let any contracts involving an expenditure of more than eight thousand
dollars ($8,000) for work to be done or more than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) for materials or supplies to be furnished, sold, or leased to the district, to the lowest responsible
bidder who shall give such security as the board requires, or
else reject all bids. This section applies to all material and
supplies whether patented or otherwise.
22. 7 Cal. 3d 861, 500 P.2d 601, 103 CaL Rptr. 689 (1972).
23. 616 F.2d at 1385.
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25454 (West 1968). Section 25454 states in full: "The board
shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, and the person to whom the
contract is awarded shall perform the work in accordance with the pIan, specifications,
strain sheets, and working details, unless the contract is modified by a four-fifths vote of
the board."

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6

98

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVmW

[Vol. 11:94

court held that the term "responsible" in section 25454 included
the attributes of trustworthiness but it also had reference to the
quality, fitness, and capacity of the low bidder to satisfactorily
perform the work.25 Accordingly, a contract must be awarded to
the lowest bidder unless it is found that he is not responsible,
that is, "not qualified to do the particular work under
consideration."26
The Ninth Circuit found that "[section] 39640 must be con~
strued to prohibit the Board from considering any factor other
than the amount of the bid, the minimum qualifications of the
bidder as to financial ability and skills to complete the job suc~
cessfully, and the quality of the bidder's past work."27 The result
of the court's opinion is that section 39640 prohibits the use of
race as a factor in determining the minimum qualifications for a
contract bidder. Because the Board could not contract with a
company under the policy without consideration of race, the
court found the policy to be in conflict with the California low
bid law and therefore beyond the authority of the Board.28
The state low bid law is race neutral on its face. Unless the
Ninth Circuit could find a constitutional duty requiring "stacked
deck" affirmative action, it would fail as being in conflict with
the state's low bid law.
D.

Is

"STACKED DECK" AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REQUIRED BY THE

CONSTITUTION?

The Negative Potential of "Stacked Deck" Affirmative Action.
The School District asserted that the Constitution imposed
a legal duty to take affirmative action to remedy the effects of
past discrimination. In order to decide whether such a duty ex~
isted the Ninth Circuit defined two types of affirmative action
programs: the "reshuffle" programs and the "stacked deck" pro~
grams.29 The Ninth Circuit explained that "stacked deck" pro~
grams are so called to "connote that one contestant has been
7 Cal. 3d at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
Id.
616 F.2d at 1385.
Id. at 139!.
29. Id. at 1386.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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given a better-than-equal chance to win."30 In "reshufHe" programs the "state neither gives to nor withholds from anyone any
benefits because of that person's group status, but rather ensures that everyone in every group enjoys the same rights in the
same place. "31
"Stacked deck" programs are those, according to the court,
"in which the state specifically favors members of minorities in
the competition with members of the majority for benefits that
the state can give to some citizens but not to all. "32 The court
noted no cases as examples of "stacked deck" affirmative action,
but quota and "positive-factor" programs were characterized as
"stacked deck" type programs.33 The Ninth Circuit stated that
while there is an "affirmative constitutional duty to use 'reshuffle' programs to cure the effects of past or present de jure segregation," there is "no constitutional duty to engage in 'stacked
deck' affirmative action."34 Other courts, however, have upheld
the validity of "stacked deck" type programs as remedial measures to cure the present effects of past discrimination. 35
A conflict concerning such an affirmative duty exists with
the Sixth Circuit, represented by Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young. 3S The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]o the extent
that the Sixth Circuit has relied on 'reshufHe' cases to find a
constitutional duty of states to take 'stacked deck' affirmative
action to eliminate the effects of past discrimination we disagree. "37 Detroit Police concerned a voluntary affirmative action
program initiated by the Detroit Police Department. Under that
plan, promotions were made to the rank of sergeant from a pool
of qualified white and black candidates. With a goal of a fiftyfifty ratio of blacks to whites staffing at all levels the plan produced approximately one new black sergeant for each new white
sergeant. Some white candidates with higher qualifying scores
30. ld. at 1386 n.7.
31. ld. at 1386. See also 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights §§ 207, 208 (1976) (defining and
.
discussing reverse discrimination in employment).
32. 616 F.2d at 1386.
33.ld.
34; ld.

35. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 91-107 (1976).
36. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. /iled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3558 (Jan. 10,
1980).
37. 616 F.2d at 1386, 1387 n.9.
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were passed over in order to achieve the fifty-fifty ratio.
The Sixth Circuit held that the plan did not violate Title
VI,3s Title VII39 nor section 1981,"0 but that "[t]he Constitution'
imposes on states a duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate
the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimination."41
However, "the Constitution not only permits but requires raceconscious action to remedy a constitutional violation. . . ."42
The Sixth Circuit then a.dopted the opinion of Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blac~un in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke"3 as offering "the most reasonable guidance"
in deciding the constitutional validity of the Detroit Police Department's quota-type affirmative action plan."" Detroit Police,
is directly in conflict wi.th the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Associated General Contractors by requiring a "stacked deck" affirmative action program, thereby setting the stage for a petition of
certiorari to the Suprome Court for a final resolution of this
question.
In support of its conclusion that there is no constitutional
duty to engage in "stacked deck" affirmative action, the Ninth
38. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000d - 2ooOd-6 (1976).
39. Id. §§ 2000e - 2oooe-1'1 (1976).
40. [d. § 1981 (1870).
41. .608 F.2d at 692.
42. [d. (emphasis added).
43. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
44. 608 F.2d at 694. In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 269 (1978), Justice Brennan stated:
[A] state government may adopt race-conscious programs if
the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial
impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason
to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of
past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large.
[d. at 369. Justice Brennan alao stated: "In addition, any statute must be stricken that
stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the political
process to bear the brunt of a benign program." Id. at 361.
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977). In that case the New York Legislature, seeking to comply with the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, engaged in a reapportionment plan along racial lines which split the
Hasidic Jewish community between two districts. The scheme took race into account,
was intended to help nonwhites, and had the effect of disadvantaging the Hasidim. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that upon "close examination" Carey is "just another
'reshufHe' case, because no individUal Hasid was placed in a district that violated the
one-person-one-vote rule, and the petitioners denied that there was a right to maintain
permanently in a single district the community's bloc voting power." 616 F.2d at 1387
n.9.
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Circuit asserted that "stacked deck" programs "trench" on fourteenth amendment values. 411 The court advanced four examples
of how this may occur: (1) "stacked deck" programs offer the
"possibility that the official discrimination is or may become invidious"; (2) in "stacked deck" programs scarce benefits are unilaterally directed to minority individuals thereby neglecting
others; (3) "stacked deck" programs carry short run benefits
only for minorities and provide no collateral benefits for the majority; and (4) the "stacked deck" program "deprives citizens of
rights. "46

Invidious Discrimination
The Ninth Circuit suggested that if "stacked deck" affirmative· action is misused, invidious discrimination may result.4'1
This, however, ignores the fact that affirmative action programs
are implemented precisely in order to eliminate the effects of
invidious discrimination. In a number of cases the Supreme
Court has recognized the validity of quota-type affirmative
action plans.4s In the recent case of United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,49 the Supreme Court considered a labor
agreement entered into by Kaiser Chemical that provided for a
training program under which one minority worker was trained
in a skilled craft for each non-minority worker. The Court held
45. 616 F.2d at 1386-87.
46. Id. at 1387. Commentators have articulated good reasons why the use of racial
criteria should be strictly construed, and approved only where a compelling need for
remedial action is demonstrated. For example:
(1) Government recognition and sanction of racial classifications may be inherently divisive, re-enforcing prejudices, confirming perceived differences between the races, and weakening the government's educative role on behalf of equality and
neutrality; (2) racial goals may also have unexpected results,
such as the development of indicia for placing individuals into
different racial categories; (3) once racial classifications are
embedded in the law, their purpose may become perverted,
and a benign preference under certain circumstances may
shade into a malignant preference at other times; and (4) a
racial preference for members of one minority may result in
discrimination against another minority.
15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 421 (1976).
47. 616 F.2d at 1387.
48. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 101 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(per Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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that the plan "fell within the area of discretion left by Title VII
to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action
plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. "50
In Davis v. County of Los Angeles51 the Ninth Circuit recognized the utility of hiring quotas to eradicate the effects of
past discrimination. In Davis, after findings by the district court
that the Los Angeles CountY Fire Department employed blacks
and Mexican-Americans "grossly out of proportion to their number in the population of Los Angeles County,"52 the district
court ordered accelerated hiring of minorities "in a ratio of one
black and one Mexican-American applicant for each three white
applicants until the effects of past discrimination had been
erased. "53 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that "the district
court was wholly justified in deciding to impose affirmative hiring orders"M in light of the substantial disparity between the
percentage of minorities in the general population and minority
firemen.
50. [d. at 209.
51. 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977).
52. [d. at 1337.
53. [d.
54. [d. at 1344. Eight courts of appeal have approved the use of accelerated hiring
goals or quotas to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. See Boston Chapter,
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975)
(§§ 1981 & 1983, Title VII); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d
622 (2nd Cir. 1974) (Title VII); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n of Memphis,
Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 19'14) (Title VII); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1974), modified, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Title VII); Morrow v. Chrisler, 491
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974) (§ 1983); Vulcan Soc'y v.
Civil Servo Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (§ 1983); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Mass., Inc. V. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974)
(Title VII); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. V. Civil Servo Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1973) (§§ 1981, 1983); United States V. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (§ 1983); Pennsylvania V. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (§ 1983);
United States V. Local 212, 4'/2 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (Title VII); United States V.
Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) (Title
VII); Castro V. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (§ 1983); United States V.
Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972) (Title
VII); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972) (§ 1983); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (Title VII); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. V. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (Title VII); United States
V. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970) (Title VII); Local
53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VII).
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Very recently, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the ten percent set aside in the PWEA in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.1515 The Court decided that "given a reasonable construction and in light of its projected administration, if we find
the [minority business enterprise] program on its face to be free
of constitutional defects, it must be upheld as within congressional power. "156 The Court went on to find the program free of
any constitutional defects.I5'1
The Ninth Circuit failed to take into account that the dangers of invidious discrimination in "stacked deck" programs can
be significantly mitigated by the incorporation of administrative
safeguards into the program designed to prevent abuse. In Fullilove the Supreme Court noted that the program was designed to
ensure that PWEA grantees would not employ procurement
practices which Congress had decided might result in the perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination.l5s The court recognized that these effects had "impaired or foreclosed" the
availability of public contracting opportunities to minority businesses.159 If a "stacked deck" program is implemented with the
goal in mind of eliminating the effects of past invidious discrimination and with proper administrative safeguards, the present
danger of invidious discrimination is nominal.
Unilateral Direction of Benefits

The Ninth Circuit cautioned that a "stacked deck" program
will be to the exclusive advantage of the minority to the consequent detriment of the majority.60 The Supreme Court was
faced with the problem of the unilateral direction of benefits to
the minority in Fullilove. In order to uphold the ten percent set
aside in the PWEA for minority contractors, it was necessary for
the Gourt to find a proper justification for the quota that did not
violate the Constitution. It reasoned that Congress had evidence
s. Ct. 2758 (1980).
56. ld. at 2776 (emphasis added).
57. ld. at 2776-80. The Court dismissed the contention that Congress must act in a
wholly color-blind fashion, the charge that the MBE program deprived nonminority business of access to governmentally generated contracting opportunities, and challenges
that the MBE program was both underinclusive and overinclusive.
58. ld. at 2775.
59.ld.
60. 616 F.2d at 1387.
55. 100
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of a long history of a marked disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to minority businesses.61 This resulted
from the existence and continuation of barriers to competitive
access which had their roots in racial and ethnic discrimination
and which persist today.62 Moreover, there was evidence of this
history not only in the federal procurement arena, but with respect to state and local construction contracting was well.68
Accordingly . . . as one aspect of the equal protection of the laws . . . Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimination of these
barriers to minority firm access to public contracting opportunities generated by the 1977 Act
was appropriate to ensure that those businesses
were not denied equal opportunity to participate
in federal grants to state and local governments.64

Thus, the Supreme Court found ample justification for Congress
to set aside ten percent for minority contractors. When the objective is remedying the present effects of past discrimination
the program is constitutionally acceptable at least when it "is
narrowly tailored to th<e achievement of that goal."811
The problem which concerned the Ninth Circuit has, therefore, been addressed by the Supreme Court. Recognizing that
dangers exist in every affirmative action program, the Supreme
Court sought to demonstrate that the program must be properly
tailored to achieve an acceptable objective. A program so
designed disadvantages the majority only insofar as is necessary
to accomplish the program's purpose - placing the minority in
an equal position under the laws.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 2767.
62. Id. The Court noted that this lack of disparity was not considered to have resulted from any lack of capable and qualified minority businesses. Id.
63.Id.
64.Id.
65. Id. at 2776. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted the following additional factors relied upon by courts of appeals:
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority group members to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population
or work force; and (iv) the availability of waiver provisions if
the hiring plan could not be met.
[d. at 2791 (per Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Short Run Collateral Benefits
As its next argument, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "in
the short run, a 'stacked deck' program works wholly to the benefit of certain members of one group, and correspondingly to the
harm of certain members of another groUp.UBS On the other hand
the court insisted that "reshufHe" programs provide some benefits also to the whites, "for their exposure to the minorities is
expected to bring understanding and wisdom."67 "Stacked deck"
programs do not provide even collateral benefits to the
majority.6s
Responding to a similar contention, the Supreme Court acknowledged that failure of nonminority firms to receive certain
contracts is an "incidental consequence" of the program.69
Nonetheless, "past impairment of minority-firm access to public
contracting opportunities may have been an incidental consequence of 'business-as-usual' by public contracting agencies and
among prime contractors. "70 The Court held that the disappointed expectations of nonminority firms was not a constitutional defect in a limited and properly tailored program.71
Judge Coffin's eloquent and often quoted observation in

Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v.
Altshuler72 may be the best rejoinder to the Ninth Circuit's
"short run" rationale:
It is by now well understood. . . that our society
cannot be completely color-blind in the short
term if we are to have a color-blind society in the
long term. After centuries of viewing through
colored lenses, eyes do not quickly adjust when
the lenses are removed. Discrimination has a way
of perpetuating itself, albeit unintentionally, because the resulting inequalities make new opportunities less accessible. Preferential treatment is
66. 616 F.2d at 1387.
67.ld.
68.ld:
69. 100 S. Ct. 2758 at 2778•.
70.ld.
71. ld. The Court stated that "[w]hen effectuating a limited and properly tailored
remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination such a 'sharing of the burden' by
innocent parties is not impermissible." ld.
72. 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
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one partial prescription to remedy out society's
most intransigent and deeply rooted inequalities.'18

The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that, when viewed in
its proper perspective, tTile short run disadvantage to the majority is merely one of the prices to be paid to remedy the longstanding effects of prior discrimination.

Deprivation of Citizen's Rights
The Ninth Circuit states that the "stacked deck" program
"arguably deprives citizens of rights 74 • • • whereas a 'reshuffle
program does not."7G Arguably, "stacked deck" affirmative action does deprive the citizen of something - the right to act in a
racially neutral manner. The quality of this right must, however,
be examined in light of the judicial interpretation of the laws
which confer this and other similar rights.
Since the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,76 the courts have recognized the need for and propriety of
affirmation action to remedy the effects of prior societal discrimination. The modern trend has been to consistently interpret
statutes which bar racial discrimination in such a way as to allow, or even require, racially conscious action in order to remedy
"the present effects of past racial discrimination."77 The Supreme Court in Bakke affirmed the validity of affirmative action
in the setting of academic admissions to institutions of higher
learning. Indeed, four members of the Supreme Court in Bakke
stated their approval of a quota-type program as a remedial
measure.78 Also, the Detroit Police court held that section 1981
does not bar racially .conscious action.79

"Stacked Deck" Under Other Authorities
The Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no precedent suggesting a fourteenth amendment duty to engage in "stacked
73. Id. at 16.
74. 616 F.2d at 1387 ("e.g., the right to make contracts, free from racial discrimination; ct. 42 U.S.C. § 1981").
75. Id. ("e.g., no 'right' to attend a segregated schoo!.").
76. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2795 (per Marshall, J., concurring opinion).
78. 438 U.S. at 378.
79. 608 F.2d at 692.
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deck" affirmative action. 80 Consequently, the court found that
the duty did not exist. 81 Numerous other authorities, however,
have recognized the permissibility of "stacked deck" programs
in various settings.82
Hiring quotas imposed after judicial findings of discrimination have long been accepted as a proper remedy under Title vn
and sections 1981 and 1983.88 Weber made affirmative action
more attractive to the private sector by allowing adoption of
programs without the necessity of a showing of prior discrimination. It is sufficient that the plan is adopted to eliminate traditional patterns of racial discrimination. Of course, while affirmative action of the quota-type may be permissible under Weber, it
is not mandatory.84
The Bakke decision did not foreclose the availability of quotas.81S Justice Powell's opinion expressly approved of preferential
quotas when predicated upon judicial findings of identified discrimination.86 Nevertheless, nowhere in the Bakke decision did
the Supreme Court hold that quota-type affirmative action is
constitutionally required.87
For about the last ten years the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance has required federal contractors to implement
affirmative action programs to increase and improve the quality
of job opportunities for minorities and women pursuant to Executive Order 11,246.88 Indeed, in Altshuler preferential ratios
under the Executive Order were approved.8s
80. 616 F.2d at 1337-88.
81. ld.
82. See notes 83-96 infra, and accompanying text.
83. Edwards, Preferential Remedies and Affirmative Action in Employment in the
Wake of Bakke, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 113.
84. See Johnson, One of Weber's Unanswered Questions: How Much Discrimination Justifies Voluntary Preferential Affirmative Action?, 83 DICKINSON L. REv.
835(1978-1979).
85. Edwards, supra note 83, at 123.
86. 438 U.S. at 307.
87. See Morrison, Status of Quotas as a Remedy in Discrimination Cases, 66
J.C.&U.L. 129 (1979-1980).
88. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,3 C.F.R. 684
(1966-1970), Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e note (1976).
89. 490 F.2d at 16-19.
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Executive Order P,246 requires every federal contract to
contain an enforceable provision guaranteeing that "applicants
and employees are employed without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin."oo The implementing regulations91 require adoption of an affirmative action program "including,
when there are deficiencies, the development of specific goals
and timetables02 . . . . Goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must be met, but must be targets reasonably attainable by means of applying every good faith effort to make all aspects of the entire affirmative action program work."os
Furthermore, "[e]ach executive department and agency which
administers a program involving Federal financial assistance
shall require as a conc1ition for the approval of any grant . . .
. the [above] provisions prescribed for Government contracts."o,
Because the Board was awarding contracts under the
PWEA, the provisions of Executive Order 11,246 appear to apply. If the appropriate "deficiencies" were found, the Board
would be required to develop "specific goals and timetables."
Obviously, this would mean a "stacked deck" program. Despite
the clear language and import of Executive Order 11,246 the
Ninth Circuit fails to mention it in Associated General
Contractors.05
The several SOurCl3S of authority which mandate or approve
of affirmative action suggest a trend towards ameliorating the
present effects of past discrimination through various experimental methods including quota-type affirmative action. The
Ninth Circuit holding in Associated General Contractors conflicts with this trend! by its broad prohibition of voluntary
"stacked deck" affirmative action programs under all circumstances. Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit may be technically
correct in its observations that "[n]o authority impels us to find
a constitutional duty to take 'stacked deck' affirmative action,"06
it is equally correct to say that substantial authority exists to
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation).
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1980).
ld.
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1977).
3 C.F.R. 339, 345 (1964-1965 Compilation).
95. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 108 (1977).
96. 616 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added).
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support a finding of that duty.

E.

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

The California Supreme Court has recently decided in
Crawford v. Board of Education,9'1 that "public officials in some
circumstances bear an affirmative obligation to design programs
or frame policies so as to avoid discriminatory results."ss The
California court, however, declined to impose an affirmative
duty under the state constitution to take affirmative action of
the quota variety.99 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit did not feel
compelled to find an affirmative duty on the part of the Board
to engage in "stacked deck" affirmative action even under the
California Constitution, and "especially in areas other than
school enrollment. "100
I

In Crawford the California Supreme CoUrt explained its
earlier decision in Santa Barbara School District v. Superior
Court.10l Santa Barbara held that because a specific statutory

racial balance quota was not constitutionally mandated it was
invalid. The Crawford Court noted the limited nature of the
Santa Barbara holding - "our decision upholding the repeal of
the specific racial balance quotas would 'in no way limit or affect
the constitutional obligations of school districts.' "102 Thus, while
Crawford "did not authorize 'stacked deck' affirmative action,"I03 such affirmative action remains permissible under the
California Constitution.
Crawford held that school districts were required to take
"reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation."I04 But
the court did not specify what steps to take. Therefore, the assertion by the Ninth Circuit that under Crawford "school boards
have an affirmative duty under the state constitution to take
'reshuffle' affirmative action to alleviate racial segregation in the
97. 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
98. ld. at 296·97, 551 P.2d at 38, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
99. ld. at 303·04, 551 P.2d at 43, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
100. 616 F.2d at 1388.
101. 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 605, 118 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1975).
102. 17 Cal. 3d at 293, 551 P.2d at 35, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (citing Santa Barbara
School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 CaL 3d at 330, 530 P.2d at 617, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 649).
103. 616 F.2d at 1388.
104. 17 Cal. 3d at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
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public schools"lOI5 is illusory.
Recently in Price v. Civil Service Commission of Sacramento County,106 the California Supreme Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action program adopted by the Sacramento
County Civil Service Commission which included a two to one
minority hiring ratio. The court pointed to its "past decisions
construing article I, sE~ction 7, subdivision (a) [the state equal
protection guarantee as reflecting its] recognition of the importance of interpreting tIne provision in light of the realities of the
continuing problems faced by minorities today."l07 The court
held that the plan did not violate federal or state equal protection guarantees "in authorizing the imposition of remedial raceconscious hiring ratios to overcome the effects of past discriminatory employment practices. "lOS
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the Price decision was
based on the "government entity's own past discrimination."l09
Moreover, the Commission in Price was authorized to make
proper findings of prior discrimination upon which the remedial
plan was based. Both of these elements are missing in Associated General Contractors. Nevertheless, the California Supreme
Court has demonstrated a peculiar sensitivity to the plight of
minorities. Associated General Contractors should not be read
to hold that the California Constitution proscribes the adoption
of remedial affirmative action programs which incorporate specific goals or ratios reasonably designed to alleviate the present
effects of past discrimination.

F.

LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE TO WEIGH SOCIAL POLICY

Legislative Foreclosure

After determining that there was no constitutional duty to
engage in "stacked deck" affirmative action, the Ninth Circuit
held that it was "constitutionally acceptable" for the state legislature to foreclose the Board from voluntarily adopting an af105. 616 F.2d at 1388.
106. 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980).
107. ld. at 284-85, 604 P.2d at 1382, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (citing Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976».
108. ld. at 283,604 P.2d at 1381, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
109. 616 F.2d at 1385 n.4.
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firmative action policy.110 The court noted that "stacked deck"
affirmative action is the type of policy question over which the
Legislature has greater competence than a local agency like the
Board.l11 Legislative interpretations or foreclosures of "stacked
deck" type programs are appropriate subjects for legislative consideration. The legislative foreclosure adverted to by the Ninth
Circuit is, however, contained in California Education Code section 39640-the "low bid law"-and is based upon the court's
strict construction of that section and not upon a "stacked
deck" statute. The foreclosure found by the court in the low bid
law was not explicitly articulated by the legislature and absent
the finding by the court of implicit foreclosure in the statute,
there would have been no conflict. A more liberal construction of
the low bid law would allow voluntary adoption of quota-type
affirmative action policies.

The Washington v. Davis1u Test
Although not unconstitutional per se because of its prohibition of the Board's affirmative action program, the Ninth Circuit
held the low bid law must still survive scrutiny under the test
articulated in Washington v. Davis.11 s The Washington Court
stated that "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise
within the power of government to pursue, is [not] invalid under
the equal protection clause simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one race than of another. "114 Even in cases
involving discriminatory impact, "the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced
to a racially discriminatory purpose."115 Noting that section
39640 is race-neutral on its face, and acknowledging that the low
bid law may have a disproportionate impact on minorities, the
Ninth Circuit held that "this is not a case where the disparity of
a law's impact 'may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because . . . the discrimination is very difficult
to explain on nonracial grounds,' thus permitting an inference of
discriminatory purpose."I1t! Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ulti110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

[d. at 1390.
[d.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
616 F.2d at 1390.
426 U.S. at 242.
[d. at 240.
616 F.2d at 1390 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
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mately upheld the low bid law as a constitutionally permissible
application of the legislature's discretionary powers.1l7
Replying to a similar conclusion, the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Police reversed a district court opinion stating that it had
failed to follow those portions of the Washington v. Davis opinion which gave guidance on evaluating proof of discriminatory
purpose. us Detroit Police pointed to portions of Washington
which indicated that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose
need not be express or appear on the face of the statute, nor is
the law's disproportionate impact irrelevant in cases involving
constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.1l9 A facially
race-neutral statute must not be applied so as indiviously to discriminate on the basis of race. l2G An invidious discriminatory
purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
for example, if the law bears more heavily on one race than another. l2l It is also frequently true that the discriminatory impact
may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality
because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. l22 The Supreme Court observed that it had not held facially race-neutral laws that serve
ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, invalid under the equal protection clause simply because they may
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.l2S "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution."l2'
The Detroit Police court then pointed to two Supreme
Court cases which enumerated a number of "subjects of proper
inquiry" to determins the existence of discriminatory intent.l211
For instance,
[t]he racial impact of the official action, the historical backgyound of decisions having disparate
117. Id. at 1391.
118. 608 F.2d at 692.
119.Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122.Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 692-93.
125. Id. at 693.
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racial impact, and the contemporary statements
of members of the decision-making body were
types of relevant evidence which should be considered.... [A]ctions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact . . . may be employed
"as one of the several kinds of proofs from which
the inference of segregative intent may be properly drawn. "126

The court concluded that discriminatory intent may be established by "any evidence which logically supports an inference
that the state action was characterized by invidious .purpose."12'1
The Washington v. Davis test complements other evidence
which may be brought to bear upon the question of invidious
discrimination. Taken by itself, Washington v. Davis makes it
"nearly impossible for plaintiffs to prove unlawful 'motive' in
most cases, especially when the challenged employment practice
is facially neutral, but has a greater adverse effect on minority
persons. "I28
Unless Washington v. Davis is read in context with the several other decisions interpreting proof of invidious discrimination, i~ meaning is subject to distortion. The Ninth Circuit de- .
termined that the low bid law passed the Washington v. Davis
test. This may be interpreted to mean that merely because the
law creates a disparate impact upon minorities it is not per se
unconstitutional and that further examination is therefore
unnecessary.
G.

'CONCLUSION

In Associated General Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School District the Ninth Circuit invalidated a voluntary
affirmative action program of the quota type adopted by the San
Francisco Board of Education. The court's analysis reached several conclusions. First, the Ninth Circuit determined that there
was a fundamental conflict between California's low bid law and
the Board's affirmative action policy. Since the statute which
confers the Board's authority proscribes such conflicts, the af126. [d.
127. [d. (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2950 (1979).
128. Edwards, supra note 83, at 119.
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firmative action policy was found to be outside the scope of the
Board's authority.
,The conflict rests upon a strict construction of the low bid
law by the Ninth Circuit, precluding race-conscious affirmative
action programs. A more encouraging result for proponents of
affirmative action could have been reached by a liberal interpretation of the statute. ,]~his would have allowed adoption of some
race-conscious programs and still enable the courts to find a
conflict where reverse invidious discrimination was evident.
Second, using newly created terminology, the Ninth Circuit
found no affirmative constitutional duty to take "stacked deck"
affirmative action under the United States and the California
constitutions. The court's definition of "stacked deck" is subject
to varying interpretations and makes the holding suspect. Although a quota-type or "positive-factor" program is still permissible in spite of the court's holding, without a precise definition
of "stacked deck" affirmative action, many race-conscious programs which stop short of imposing quotas or goals may be faced
with substantial new roadblocks. Moreover, the holding has the
effect of stifling much needed experimentation with race-conscious affirmative action.
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Detroit Police, which upheld
the validity of a quota-type affirmation plan, is in direct conflict
with Associated General Contractors. Unlike Associated General Contractors, the Detroit Police court followed a line of
cases approving the use of quota-type affirmative action programs when employed to ameliorate the present effects of past
discrimination. Various limitations have been placed upon these
plans to ensure their administration free from abuse. 129 A properly designed quota-type affirmative action program takes into
account the dangers inherent in "stacked deck" programs and is
an appropriate remedial vehicle. The ultimate resolution of this
129. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. at 2784-85 (Powell, J., concurring) (reviewing the requirements imposed by the courts when considering race-conscious affirmative action); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972) (the plan must be ShOl1; term after which all decisions are to be made on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Servo Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (quota must be reasonably
related to the relevant percentage of minorities in the work force).
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controversy, however, awaits a ruling by the Supreme Court.
Insofar as the California Supreme Court has demonstrated a
particular awareness of the effects of a history of discrimination
against minorities, it appears the court would be receptive to a
suggestion that a properly designed quota-type program is constitutionally permissible and even required under appropriate
circumstances. The broad prohibition in Associated General
Contractors of voluntary adoption of "stacked deck" affirmative
action programs is therefore especially questionable under the
California Constitution.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit decided that, the low bid law was
not constitutional as applied. Because this portion of the opinion
turned on a strict construction of the low bid law and of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is amenable to the same criticism and mandates an identical concern.
The court's best argument came from its perception that
"even if the argued-for constitutional duty exists, it could not
come into play until proper findings were made of discrimination and the need for affirmative action to redress it. "130 In
Bakke, Justice Powell noted that "a governmental body must
have the authority and capability to establish, in the record,
that the classification is responsive to identified discrimination. "131 The Bakke court failed to find that a medical school
had the authority to make appropriate findings with respect to
its own admissions program. It is, therefore, unlikely that the
same court would hold that the Board has authority to mBke
appropriate findings regarding discrimination in the local construction industry.
Because the Board overstepped its authority in making
findings of discrimination in the local construction industry, the
ultimate holding of the court in Associated General Contractors
appears to be correct. Despite this fact, however, Associated
General Contractors is antithetical to the modern trend of
widening the scope of remedies available to minorities to relieve
130. 616 F.2d at 1388.
131. 438 U.S. at 309.
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the present effects of past discrimination. It should therefore be
limited to its facts.

Brian Beverly*

m.
A.

RESIDENT RE:QUffiEMENTS AND THE FORMER
RESIDENT'S RIGHT TO TRAVEL - FISHER V.
REISER
INTRODUCTION

In Fisher v. Reiser, l a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of Nevada's industrial insurance
scheme which provided workers' compensation benefits irrespective of the recipient's place of residence, but which conditioned
receipt of cost-of-livilng supplemental benefits on residence in
the state. Plaintiff claimed that the residence requirement for
the workers' compensation cost-of-living supplement penalized
those beneficiaries who exercised their constitutional right to
emigrate from one sta,te to another, and denied them equal protection under the law.
Pursuant to the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act,2 the Nevada Industrial Commission administered a state insurance fund
which was financed by employer premiums and used to pay
workers' compensatio:n benefits to injured workers and their survivors. An employee who was injured while working in Nevada
for a covered Nevada employer was eligible to receive workers'
compensation.s Worker's benefits were payable regardless of
where the beneficiary resided after his or her injury.
Because the level of benefits available to an injured worker
or his or her survivors was based on a percentage of the wage
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were
East, D.J., sitting by designation, and Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
2. NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 616.010-.680 (1977).
3. Also eligible were workers hired or regularly employed in Nevada who were injured while temporarily working for their covered Nevada employer outside the state. [d.
§ 616.520.
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earned by the worker at the time of injury;' inflation particularly
hurt workers' compensation recipients. In response to their
plight, in 1973 and again in 1975, the Nevada Legislature appropriated general funds to supplement workers' benefits paid to
recipients of permanent and total disability and death benefits.II
Unlike the basic workers' benefits, the cost-of-living supplemental benefits were not granted to those workers' compensation
beneficiaries who had emigrated from Nevada. 6
Plaintiff, Mrs. Fisher, and her husband were Nevada residents when, in 1962, plaintiff's husband was rendered totally
disabled in an industrial accident while employed by a Nevada
employer. Under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, plaintiff's
husband qualified for and received permanent total disability
benefits and continued to receive these benefits after plaintiff
and her husband moved to California. When plaintiff's husband
died in 1972, plaintiff became eligible for and received death
benefits'1 because her husband's death resulted from the injuries
he sustained in the workers' compensation-covered accident.
However, plaintiff was not eligible for the cost-of-living supplement because she was no longer a Nevada resident.
Plaintiff brought an action in federal district

COurt,8

con-

4. The level of benefits available to the injured worker or his survivors was dependent upon the nature of the injury and the average wage of the worker at the time of the
injury. Until death, permanently and totally disabled workers were entitled to monthly
payments of two-thirds of their average wage. ld. § 616.580. The surviving spouse of an
employee whose death was caused by a job-related accident was entitled to death benefits of the same monthly amount. Death benefits were paid until the surviving spouse's
death or remarriage. ld. § 616.615.
5. In 1973, permanent total disability benefits for industrial injuries occurring
before April 9, 1971 were increased by 10%, and death benefits based on industrial injuries occurring before July 1, 1973 were also increased by 10%. In 1975 the same benefit
adjustment was increased to 20%. ld. §§ 616.626,616.628.
The cost-of-living supplement was paid out of a silicosis and disabled pension fund
which had been established by an appropriation from general revenues when the Nevada
Legislature extended workers' compensation to persons injured by exposure to silicon
dioxide dust. This fund was used to reimburse the Nevada Industrial Commission for
payment of silicosis claims and the cost-of-living supplement in disability and death benefit cases. ld. §§ 617.323, 617.460.
6. ld. §§ 616.626, 616.628.
7. Mrs. Fisher received death benefits equal to one-half of Mr. Fisher's average wage
because Mr. Fisher was injured prior to the date when death benefits were increased to
two-thirds of the deceased employee's average wage. ld. § 616.615.
8. Mrs. Fisher brought a class action on behalf of all non-resident workers' compensation beneficiaries not receiving the cost-of-living Bupplement, seeking declaratory and
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tending that the residence requirement for the cost-of-living
supplement impermissibly burdened her constitutional right to
travel, and denied her equal protection under the law.9

B.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

In recent years the Supreme Court has attempted to delineate the constitutional right to travel, a right long recognized as
fundamental. lo In the landmark case of Shapiro v. Thompson l l
the Court struck down state statutesl2 conditioning eligibility for
welfare upon a one year durational residence. Viewing the right
to travel as including the right to migrate, "with intent to settle
and abide,"I8 the Court found that conditioning eligibility for
welfare upon a one year durational residence penalized those
persons who had exercised their constitutional right to travel. l •
Finding the fundamental right to travel impinged, the Court
subjected the durational residence requirement to the strict
scrutiny standard of review,lII and found the requirement unnecinjunctive relief against officials of the Nevada Industrial Commission and the Nevada
State Treasurer. Federal jurisdiction was invoked under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
9. The district court refuJJed to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review. The
court held that the Nevada scheme involved a simple residency requirement which fell
outside the scope of the constitutional right to travel. Applying the rational basis standard of review, the district court found no equal protection violation because the residence requirement was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of protecting the health and welfare of Nevada's citizens while limiting the expenditure of
general revenues. 610 F.2d at 633.
10.
The constitutionlll right to travel from one State to another
• . • occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established
and repeatedly recognized.
. . . • [Tlhe right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right 80
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United
States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
11. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
12. Shapiro also involved a District of Columbia statutory provision.
13. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1973) (noting that the
Court in Shapiro was "concerned only with the right to migrate, 'with intent to settle
and abide' or . . . 'to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life.' ").
14. The Court did not require evidence of actual deterence. See Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972).
15. Classifications that inlpinge on a fundamental right or that are based on suspect
criteria such as race are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. Otherwise a
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essary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the Court held the requirement invalid because it denied
new residents equal protection under the law.
The Shapiro Court made clear that "[t]he residence requirement and the waiting-period requirement are distinct and
independent prerequisites,"18 and that it was only the waiting
period which implicated right-to-travel concerns in that case.
Two extremely important questions were left unresolved. First,
how severely must the constitutional right to travel be burdened
before the burden operates to penalize those individuals who
choose to exercise the right?l'1 Second, can a bona fide residence
requirement for government monetary benefits ever unduly impinge the right to travel?18
The :first question was addressed, but by no means completely resolved, five years later in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,19 in which the Court invalidated a one year durational county residence requirement for nonemergency medical
rational basis standard of review is invoked. To survive an equal protection challenge
under strict scrutiny, a statutory classification must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, whereas, under the rational basis test, a statutory classification is not violative of equal protection if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See generally Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1975): Note, The Right to Travel - Quest For a Constitutional
Source, 6 RUT. CAM. L.J. 122 (1974); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
16. 395 U.S. 618, 636 (1969). A simple residence requirement requires a person to be
present, i.e. be a bona fide resident. A durational residence requirement requires a person to have been a resident for a given period of time as a condition to eligibility for a
government benefit.
17. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974) ("amount
of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear"
in Shapiro).
18. In leaving these two questions unresolved, the Court stated:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determinint eligibility to vote, eligibility
for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may
promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the
other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel
394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
19. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Two years earlier, the Court held that one-year durational
residence requirements for voting were invalid on the ground that the right to exercise
the franchise is a fundamental right. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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care. "Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty
analysis," the Maricopa Court stated that a classification penalizes the exercise of the right to travel if it denies "a basic necessity of life," or "governmental privileges or benefits necessary to
basic sustenance. "20
In Califano v. Torres 21 the Court upheld a requirement of
residence in one of the fifty states (the ciaimant had moved to
Puerto Rico) in order to be eligible for various old age and disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income Act.
The Court held that the Constitution does not embrace a doctrine whereby a perSOll who moves to Puerto Rico must be given
benefits superior to those enjoyed by other residents of Puerto
Rico. The Court went on to state in dictum:
Such a doctrine would apply with equal force to
any benefits a State might provide for its residents, and would require a State to continue to
pay those benefits indefinitely to any persons who
had once resided there. And the broader implications of such a doctrine in other areas of substantive law would bid fair to destroy the independent
power of each state under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its
residents.lUI

The Ninth Circuit in Fisher primarily focused on these Supreme Court precedents in resolving the constitutionality of Nevada's industrial insurance scheme.
C.

ANALYSIS

Majority Opinion
Construing Shapiro, Maricopa County, and Torres to stand
for the proposition tTrlat the right to migrate component of the
right to travel insures that only new residents-and not former
residents-of a state to have a right to vital government benefits, the majority fOUlad the faet that Fisher arose in an emigration context to be u<:ritical." Because the cost-of-living supplement was financed by general funds, the majority analogized the
supplement to welfare benefits. On this basis, the majority found
20. 415 U.S. at 258-59.
21. 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
22. [d. at 4-5.
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principles of federalism to be of overriding importance, stating
that "a state is limited, both in its competence and its responsibility, to exercising its welfare powers for those persons who are
its residents."23 With principles of federalism placing "[a]ny primary obligation to ascertain a citizen's economic status or condition and to make provision for his or her well-being ... upon
the state of current residence, not the state where the citizen
formerly resided,"24 the majority concluded that Mrs. Fisher and
others in her class were not penalized for exercising their constitutional right to travel.
In further distinguishing Fisher from Shapiro and Maricopa County, the majority noted that only certain durational
residence requirements were invalidated in Shapiro and Maricopa County, and held that Fisher involved only a simple residence requirement. Close analysis reveals that this second basis
for distinguishing Fisher is actually"an integral part of the immigration/emigration distinction. In construing Shapiro and Maricopa County as standing for the proposition that the right to
travel insures only new residents a right to certain government
benefits, the majority effectively ruled out the possibility that in
an emigration context a right-to-travel claim could present a durational residence requirement. That is, for the majority, the
concept of durational residence can only be applicable in an immigration context. Because Fisher arose in an emigration context, Fisher necessarily presented to the majority only a simple
residence requirement. Thus, this purported second basis for
distinguishing Fisher from Shapiro and Maricopa County is not
a separate distinction, but is simply an attribute of the distinction between immigration and emigration.

The majority proceeded to find Shapiro and Maricopa
County unsupportive of the plaintiff in Fisher on a third basis,
and in so doing, confused its analysis. Having "a significant
bearing upon [the majority's] decision" was the fact that, unlike
the benefits involved in Shapiro and Maricopa County, eligibility for the cost-of-living supplement was not based upon the re23. 610 F.2d at 633. Thus, the majority was "reluctant to impose upon states fiscal
burdens that are not coterminous either with their taxing power or their general jurisdiction." ld. at 634.
24. ld. at 633. The majority did leave open the possibility that a state may be held
to have some continuing obligations to former residents.
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cipient's financial need. The majority construed Supreme Court
precedent to stand for the proposition that the deprivation of a
government benefit not based upon the recipient's financial need
is not of such severity as to penalize an individual for exercising
the right to travel. On this basis the majority concluded that the
residence requirement did not penalize the plaintiff in Fisher.
The majority's severity-of-the-burden analysis only serves
to confuse the actual basis for the holding in Fisher. If, as the
majority apparently held, a classification based upon residence is
not "subject to strict scrutiny when attacked by one who has
migrated from the state which denies the benefit in question,"211
then the severity of the deprivation suffered by the emigrant is
irrelevant. Simply put, if principles of federalism are of such importance that the right to travel does not mandate that a state
provide former residents with the same government benefits as
are provided residents, then the importance of the benefit to the
otherwise eligible form.er resident is simply not an issue. In Shapiro and Maricopa County. it was necessary to resolve the question of the severity of the burden imposed upon the right to
travel in order to determine whether the government's justification had to meet the strict scrutiny or the rational basis standard of judicial review. 26 This was unnecessary in Fisher because
the majority had already determined that strict scrutiny was inappropriate in an emigration context. Had the majority's finding
as to the severity of the deprivation suffered by the Fisher
claimants been the basis for an alternative holding rather than
having had "a significant bearing" upon the overall decision,
perhaps the rationale for the decision would have been clearer.
The Fisher opinion did not make clear whether the right to
travel was not sufficiently infringed solely on the ground that
the plaintiff was a former resident, that is, because federalism
considerations are tantamount to a compelling governmental interest, or because the Fisher claimants ended up on the losing
side of a balancing test in which concerns of federalism were
weighed against the degree of the deprivation they suffered.
25. Id. at 633.
26. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 253 ("In determining whether
the challenged durational residence provision violates the Equal Protection Clause, we
must first determine what burden of justification the classification created thereby must
meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual interests
affected.").
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Whatever the reason for finding that the fundamental right
to travel was not infringed in Fisher, the majority proceeded to
subject the Nevada statutory classification to the deferential rational basis standard of review. As the residence requirement for
the workers' compensation supplement was rationally related to
the legitimate governmental interests of protecting the welfare
of Nevada's citizens while limiting the expenditure of state
funds,27 the majority held there was no equal protection
violation.28

Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting, Judge Hufstedler took a broader view of Supreme Court precedent, maintaining that the distinction between emigration and immigration "has no constituitonal significance because interstate travel is not a one-way road. "29 For the
dissent, a durational residence requirement "occurs when a person is effectively required to have resided in a State at two distinct points in time in order to obtain a benefit."so Since the
workers' compensation beneficiaries were "effectively required to
have resided in the state at the time of their injury and at present" to be eligible for the cost-of-living supplement, the dissent
maintained that the durational aspect of residence, at issue in
Shaprio and Maricopa County, was present in Fisher.
Accordingly, the dissent viewed the workers' cost-of-living
supplement as being unlike welfare because the "essential nexus
of eligibility" was a past connection with the state-past employment and injury in the state. In distinguishing the simple
residence requirements that the Shapiro, Maricopa County, and
Torres Courts held valid in the context of welfare, nonemer27. For the majority, the fact that the residence requirement partially obstructed
the objective of providing workers' compensation beneficiaries with additional income
was not important because there were other legitimate governmental interests furthered
by the residence requirement.
28. The majority noted that the allocation of government revenues demands a high
degree of judicial deference when no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved. See, e.g., Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) ("Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another
are 'not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to [the Legislature], unless the
choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.' ")
(quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937».
29. 610 F.2d at 640.
30.ld.
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gency medical care, and Supplemental Security Income benefits,
respectively, the dissent observed that bona fide residence was
"the nexus of eligibility for those benefits." That is, once a resident, there was no eligibility requirement of a past connection
with the state. In the context of workers' benefits which are
designed to compensate injured workers and their survivors for
loss of earning power caused by injuries sustained while contributing to a state's labor force, the dissent maintained that "to
require a present connection • . . unduly penalizes plaintiff's
constitutional right to travel. "S1 Accordingly, the fact that the
worker's supplement was subsidized by general revenues was of
no importance to the dissent because "[t]he method that the
state chooses to financt~ payment of workers' benefits does not
mean that the state may discriminate against eligible workers
solely because they exercise their right to travel. "82
Having found the durational aspect of residence present in
Fisher, the dissent proceeded to find the deprivation suffered by
the former-resident workers' compensation beneficiaries to be of
such severity as to conutitute a penalty for having exercised the
right to travel. For thE~ dissent, the deprivation of the cost-ofliving supplement was analogous to those deprivations found to
impermissibly burden the right :to travel in Shapiro and Maricopa County because i.t was "aid upon which may depend the
ability ... to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter,
and other necessities of life."s8 The dissent was unable to construe Supreme Court precedent as holding that the benefit in
question must be baaed upon the recipient's financial need
before the deprivation of the benefit may constitute a penalty
for exercising the right to travel. Undoubtedly, the dissent approached the question of the severity of the burden in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. Although Shapiro and
31. [d. at 641. As discussed later in the text, the dissent found that the denial of the
cost-of-living supplement to former-resident workers' compensation beneficiaries rose to
the level of a penalty as delineated in Shapiro and Maricopa County.
. 32. [d. at 641. In further support of the argument that the cost-of-living supplement
was not welfare, but instead was part of the workers' compensation program, the dissent
noted that general funds were appropriated to extend workers' compensation to workers
contracting silicosis while working in Nevada. The dissent also noted that, unlike the
benefits involved in Torres, the cost-of-living supplement would not have provided former residents of Nevada with benefits superior to those enjoyed by citizens of the former
resident's new state of residence.
33. [d. at 642 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 627).
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Maricopa County involved benefits where eligibility was conditioned upon the recipient's financial need, the Supreme Court
focused on the actual significance to the claimant of the benefit
in question rather than on the criteria establishing eligibility.
Thus, although a government benefit not conditioned upon
financial need is likely to be less significant to the recipient than
a benefit which is not so conditioned, to find the absence of a
financial need requirement conclusive as to the insignificance of
the benefit is simplistic.U One might speculate whether the majority would have reached the same conclusion had plaintiff returned to Nevada and had been required to wait one year before
being eligible for the cost-of-living supplement. Apparently the
majority was reluctant to expressly elevate federalism considerations to the level of compelling governmental interests. Thus,
the fact that eligibility for the supplement was not based upon'
financial need provided the majority with a convenient escape.
The dissent, having found that the residence requirement
for the cost-of-living supplement effectively penalized those
workers' compensation beneficiaries who exercised their constitutional right to travel, applied the strict scrutiny standard of
review to the statutory classification. The conservation of state
funds was the only justification offered by Nevada for discriminating against former resident workers' compensation beneficiaries. Because this is not a compelling governmental interest,a5
the dissent found the residence requirement violative of equal
protection.

D.

CONCLUSION

As the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fisher indicates, the constitutional right to travel, although fundamental, remains quite
34. The majority had found support for the notion that severity-of-the-burden analysis turns on whether eligibility for a government benefit is conditioned upon financial
need in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), where disability benefits were terminated. Although the Court found the disability benefits to be of less significance than
welfare benefits because the former were not based on financial need, Mathews involved
a due process claim, whereas Fisher involved an equal protection claim. Also, unlike
Fisher, the disability benefits in Mathews would have been paid on proof that the claimant was still disabled.
35. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 263 ("The conservation of the taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residence requirement which. • • severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely
migrate and settle in another state.").
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amorphous. The majority's simplistic approach to the right to
travel claim presented in Fisher may lead other courts to find
that eligibility for a government benefit must be conditioned
upon the recipient's financial need before right-to-travel concerns are implicated. U courts adopt the majority's approach,
the question of the actual significance of the benefit in question
to a potential recipient will be of secondary importance, only becoming an issue if the henefit is based upon financial need. Unfortunately, as the dissllmt in Fisher indicated, a financial need
requirement is certainly not determinative of whether a benefit
is "aid upon which mBLY depend the ability ... to obtain the
very means to subsist." Adopting the majority's approach will, in
effect, base the resolution of right to travel issues on matters of
form rather than substance. The fundamental right to travel
should certainly not be: delineated in such a manner.
Other courts should avoid Fisher and continue to adhere to
the idea "that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land uninhibited by StaLtuteS, rules, and regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. "86

Curtis E. Blystone*

IV. COMPLEX CASES: AN EXCEPTION TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY?

A.

INTRODUCTION

In In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation1 (USF Litiga-

tion), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the
question of "whether there is a 'complexity' exception to the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases."2 The trial
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629.
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were
Kilkenny, J., dissenting, and Byrne, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
1866 (1980).
2. ld. at 413.
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court had struck sua sponte all demands for trial by jury on the
ground that the complicated nature of the litigation was such as
to render it beyond the practical abilities and limitations of a
jury.3

USF Litigation involved eighteen separate lawsuits,' including five plaintiff classes, filed by a variety of plaintiffs, most of
whom were pUrchasers or representatives of purchasers of various stock and debenture offerings made by U.S. Financial5
(USF) over a period of several years. Although USF was the focal point of all the controversy, over one hundred defendants
were involved in the litigation, including about twenty individual defendants and over eighty corporate and partnership defendants. The litigation was further complicated by the fact that
within some of the cases there were sub-groups of plaintiffs asserting claims against sub-groups of defendants. Numerous
cross-claims were made by certain defendants against various
other defendants. A multitude of allegations were made and a
multitude of claims asserted-all dealing with violations of federal and state securities laws, common law fraud, and negligence.
The trial court found that the fact-finder would have to
read about 100,000 pages of documents,6 that about 250 witnesses would be called by the plaintiffs alone,'1 and that the trial
would probably last two years.8 Central to the litigation was the
fact-finder's ability to understand the massive and complex ac3. See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977). The trial
court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
4. The various lawsuits were filed in five federal judicial districts including the federal court for the Southern District of California. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation found that the cases presented common issues and allegations and were accordingly transferred to the Southern District of California for coordinated pretrial proceedings. See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 385 F. Supp. 586 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit.
1974); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 1403 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1974).
5. U.S. Financial was a large vertically integrated corporation which was engaged in
virtually all aspects of the real estate development business, including design, construction, and sale of various kinds of structures, financing of real estate projects, and title
insurance. It operated individually, through subsidiaries, and through the concept of
joint ventures. Its growth from 1966 to 1972 had been phenomenal.
6. The district court stated that "reading those 100,000 pieces of paper would be
like sitting down to read the first 90 volumes of the Federal Reporter, 2nd Series -including all the headnotes." In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D.
Cal. 1977).
7. Id. at 707-08.
8. Id. at 713.
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counts and the accounting procedures employed by USF, its
subsidiaries, and its joint venture partners. The fact-finder
would also be required to understand various competing and
highly technical accounting theories in order to ascertain
whether the accounting practices of USF and its affiliates were
as they should have been. The fact-finder would also be required
to undersand and apply a variety of legal theories, which varied,
of course, depending upon the claims and parties at issue.
The trial court concluded that a jury was not capable of understanding and rationally reconciling the voluminous data and
then properly applying the variety of legal theories. The trial
court further concluded that it would be extremely difficult to
find jurors who could sit through a two-year trial. On these
grounds the trial court concluded that there was no adequate
remedy at law, and thus ordered that the cases be tried without
a jury.9
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding "that there is no complexity exception to the seventh amendment right to jury trial in
civil cases. "10 "We do not accept the underlying premise . . .
'that a single judge is brighter than the jurors collectively functioning together.' "11
B.

BACKGROUND

Traditionally, the scope of the seventh amendment12 guarantee has been determined by applying a "historical test" which
looks to the English common law as it existed in 1791, the time .
of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 1s Although "the thrust of
9. Id. at 711-15.
10. 609 F.2d at 432.
11. Id. at 431, (quoting Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and
the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 53 (1977».
12. The seventh amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. Vil.
13. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333 (1979); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 657 (1935) ("The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed
under the English common law when the amendment was adopted."); Dimick v. Schiedt,
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the amendment was to preserve the right to trial by jury as it
existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends
beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at that
time."14 Thus, the critical dividing line under the historical test
is between "law" and "equity."15
The historical test has been applied to "preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished
293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
14. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 193; Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374
(1974) (quoting Curtis v. Loether). Thus, the seventh amendment has been found applicable to causes of action based on statutes which create legal rights and remedies. See,
e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. at 375-76; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 477 (1962) (trademark laws); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946);
Luria v. United States, 231.U.S. 9 (1913); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115
(1909) (immigration laws).
15. In describing this distinction, the Supreme Court in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 433 (1830), stated:
By common law, [the framers of the seventh amendment]
meant what the constitution denominated in the third article
"law;" not merely suits, which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra-distinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized,
and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in the
admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and
equity, was often found in the same suit.
Id. at 446. Accord, Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 449 (1977); Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 US. 363, 374-75 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970).
Apparently, reference to the English common law and the subsequent establishment
of the historical test were more or less accidental developments. See generally Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973).
Justice Story was apparently the first to refer to English common law as the foundation
for seventh amendment analysis:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not
the common law of any individual state (for it probably differs
in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to
expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be
obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the
law:
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.D. Mass. 1812). Wolfram stated that this
rule has never been seriously questioned; "perhaps later judges have hesitated to appear
to be the kind of intractable person that would require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on
the obvious." Wolfram, supra, at 641.
At any rate, once reference to English practice became accepted, the historical test
followed. Wolfram suggested that this was probably required in order to prevent the
seventh amendment's guarantee from depending upon changes which occurred in English practice with respect to jury trials long after Amerian independence. See Wolfram,
supra, at 642. It seems only logical to adopt some sort of historical standard in that the
seventh amendment requires that "the right of trial by jury be preserved."
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from mere matters of form or procedure . . . ."16 Thus, although
procedural changes since 1791 have contracted the civil jury's
historical role to some extent, they have been held as not violative of the seventh amendment. 17 '
Other procedural changes have had the effect of expanding
the right to trial by jury, particularly the merger of the federal
law and equity courts lit} 1938 and the accompanying new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the merger of law and
equity was not intended to affect the scope of the right to trial
by jury,16 a problem was created as to those matters in which the
plaintiff previously "had an option as to the mode of trial that
excluded any option by defendant or any discretion by the court
. . . . [T]he [post-merger] question, properly put, [was] between
giving effect to the plaintiff's former option and giving defendant a counter-option . . . ."19 The Supreme Court addressed
16. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. lbldman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). See also
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) ("the Amendment was designed to
preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the
great mass of procedural forms and details •.•."); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. at 392).
17. See e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335-37 (1979) (use of offensive collateral estoppel when plaintiff was not a party to the previous proceedings is
not inconsistent with seventh amendment even though mutuality of parties was required
in 1791); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156·57 (1973) (seventh amendment does not
require 12-member jury); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943) (directed
verdict not inconsistent with seventh amendment); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Re·
fining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) (verdict may be set aside in part and new trial or·
dered on the relevant issues); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920) (court appointed auditor for purpose of examining accounts between the parties and simplifying
and defining issues to be presented to jury does not violate seventh amendment); Walker
v. New Mexico & S.P.R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (general verdict may be set aside
when inconsistent with special verdict and judgnIent entered on basis of special verdict).
18. FED. R. ClV. P. 38(a) provides that: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States
shall.be preserved to the parties inviolate."
19. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIV1L PROCEDURE § 8.7, at 374-75 (2d ed. 1977). Judge
Wisdom described the problenl as follows:
[T]he liberal joinder provisions and the broad, sometimes
mandatory, counterclaim provisions of the Federal Rules
mixed legal and equitable causes in a single litigation with unprecedented frequency . • . • The difficulty comes in deciding
whether the legal or the equitable cause should be tried
first-an issue of practical importance to litigants, since the
determination of either cause acts as collateral estoppel on
common questions of fact in the other. The broad grant of discretion under Rule 42 for a trial judge to order separate trials
would seem to imply authority to decide the order of the sepa-
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this problem in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover O and in
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood. 21 In each case identical factual issues were presented in the legal and equitable claims. In the
Dairy Queen opinion the Court stated that:
The holding in Beacon Theatres was that where
both legal and equitable issues are presented in a
single case, "only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the
flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of
equitable Claims."22

This Beacon Theatres/Dairy Queen "nature of the issue" test
operated to expand the traditional historical test, giving the defendant a right to jury trial where previously there was no right.
However, the question of whether the Beacon Theatres/Dairy
Queen holding was constitutionally required, or only represented
an "equitable doctrine," was not made clear by those cases.23
Undoubtedly, the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided an adequate remedy at law in matters where formerly
there was no adequate legal remedy; and, of course, an inadequate legal remedy has always been a requirement for equity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court resolveg the unanswered question in Ross v. Bernhard,2' in which it was established that the
expanded historical test, that is, the Beacon Theatres/Dairy
Queen nature of the issue test, is constitutionally required.
rate trials, but courts struggled with this problem without
clear guidelines. Some decisions rested on the "basic nature"
of the case taken as a whole. In many other decisions this test
was not recognized and the choice was left to the discretion of
the trial judge. On occasion, attempts to apply the "basic nature" test have led to inconsistent results.
Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 488-89 (5th Cir.
1961) (footnotes omitted).
20. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
21. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
22. ld. at 472-73 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. at 510-11).
Dairy Queen also made clear that "the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be
made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings." Thus, a claim for a
money judgment for breach of contract is not equitable solely because the claim is "cast
in terms of an 'accounting' rather than in terms of an action for 'debt' or 'damages.' " ld.
at 477-78.
23. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966), where the Court referred to the
Beacon Theatres/Dairy Queen holding as an "equitable doctrine."
24. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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Thus, "[t]he Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather, than the character of the
overall action. "211
However, immediatoly after this apparent reaffirmation of
the historical test, in its constitutionally required expanded version, the Supreme Cour~ added a footnote which has been the
source of much of the recent confusion regarding the scope of
the seventh amendment. In this footnote the Supreme Court
stated the following:
As our cases in.dicate, the "legal" nature of an
issue is determined by considering, first, the premerger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these
factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly
abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most
difficult to apply.ss

It is the third factor of this test which has led to much confusion

recently, causing many federal courts to believe that the historical test has been abandoned. The third prong of this test has
provided the basis for some federal courts to find that there is a
"complexity exception" to the seventh amendment right to trial
by jury; the first two prongs of the test traditionally being necessary for seventh amendment analysis.
Until Ross, with the possible exception of the equitable accounting cases/~'1 the Supreme Court had never indicated that
jury competence is a factor to be considered in determining a
litigant's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The Ninth
Circuit's rejection of tbis "suggestion of infidelity to the [histori25. [d. at 538 (footnote omitted). Thus, "where equitable and legal claims are joined
in the same action, there is a light to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be
infringed either by trYing the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court
trial of a common issue existing between the claims." [d. at 537-38.
It should be noted that Ross did not involve a situation in which the plaintiff had had
an option previous to merger of proceeding at law or in equity. Ross dealt with the question of whether the plaintiff in a stockholders' derivative suit had a right to trial by jury
on legal issues even though before merger such a plaintiff had to proceed in equity because the law courts did not recognize stockholder derivative suits.
26. [d. at 538 n.lO.
27. For a discussion of the equitable accounting cases, see text accompanying notes
30-41 infra.
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cal] test"28 will be discussed in the following section of this
Note.
·C.

ANALYSIS

Three alternative theories have been developed by those
federal courts which have found a "complexity exception" to the
seventh amendment right to trial by jury and were espoused by
the defendants in aSF Litigation. The Ninth Circuit dismissed
each of these theories as being unsound and held the traditional
historical test applicable, stating that "where legal relief is
sought and legal rights are asserted, ... the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial."29 The following three
subsections will analyze each of these theories and the Ninth
Circuit's rationale for finding them inapplicable in aSF
Litigation.

Complex Cases-Analogous to an Action for an Equitable
Accounting?
The defendants in aSF Litigation argued that the complexity of the litigation rendered it analogous to an action for an
equitable accounting where historically there was no right to a
jury trial. 30 This argument actually purported not to be a claim
28. Wolfram, supra note 14, at 643.
29. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 423 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth
Circuit summari2ed the type of relief sought and rights asserted in USF Litigation as
follows:
The remedy which is sought in all of the consolidated cases is
damages, which is the traditional form of relief granted by the
common law courts. The substantive rights asserted are, in
part, based on the common law principle of fraud and negligence. The statutory rights under the securities laws . • •
merely create new legal duties.

Id.
30. In Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887), the jurisdiction of equity was sustained even though the matter was cogni2able at law on the ground that the
ccmplexity of the accounts between the parties rendered the legal remedy inadequate.
"The case made by the plaintiff is clearly one of which a court of equity may take cognizance. The complicated nature of the accounts between the parties constitutes itself a
sufficient ground for going into equity." Id. at 134. In Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
495 (1831), the Court stated the rule that "in transactions [not involving certain fiduciary relationships], great complexity ought to exist in the accounts, or some difficulty at
law should interpose, some discovery should be required, in order to induce a court of
chancery to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 503. Accord, H.B. Zachry Co. v. Terry, 195 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1952); Quality Realty Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 50 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1931);
Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928), af!'d on other
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that there is an exception to the seventh amendment for complex cases but instead was based upon the doctrine that traditional equity powers permit equity jurisdiction when the remedy
at law is inadequate. The underlying rationale of defendant's attempt to analogize USF' Litigation to the historical action for an
equitable accounting is that when the so-called complexity of a
case is such as to render it beyond the practical abilities and
limitations of a jury, the remedy at law is inadequate and thus
the case should be cognizable in equity. Thus, under this argument, the Ross test81 in purported not to be a new test for the
seventh amendment but simply a "restatement of . . . traditional equity powers."a:1
The Ninth Circuit rejected the USF Litigation defendants'
attempted analogy in a very cursory fashion, simply stating that
the argument
attempts to have the legal or equitable nature of
the case characterized as a whole rather than by
examining the nature of the issues involved. . . .
the issues presented here are of a legal nature.
The fact that :resolution of the issues will involve
an examination of USF's accounts, and accounting procedures, cannot transform the case into an
action for an tlquitable accounting.33

Although USF Litigation did not involve actions for an
equitable accounting, the Ninth Circuit declined to deal specmgrounds, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931). See also Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505
(1889); Standard Oil Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line RR Co., 13 F.2d 633 (W.D. Ky. 1926),
aff'd on other grounds, 275 U.S. 257 (1927).
31. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
32. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.RD. 59, 66-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In
adopting this view of the third prong of the Ross test the Bernstein court stated that
where the "remedy sought" necessarily involves determination
of complexities that "only a court of equity can satisfactorily
unravel," the "practical abilities and limitations of juries" are
also necessarily involved and must be considered in evaluating
the right to a juroJ trial. The adequacy of the legal remedy necessarily involves the jury and its competency to find the facts.
Id. at 66. This view was adopted by the district court in USF Litigation. See In re U.S.
Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.RD. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (per Turrentine, D.J.), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (Killdnney, J., dissenting, based on the views expressed in the
district court opinion). Accord, n..C Peripherals v. International Business Machs., 458 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
33. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 423 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980).
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cally with the distinguishing factors. Thus, a conclusion as to
whether the Ninth Circuit was ultimately correct in rejecting the
defendants' attempt to analogize USF Litigation to an action
for an equitable accounting requires a brief discussion of the nature and present status of the equitable accounting cases, as well
as the rationale for historically permitting equity to try those
cases.
Historically, a plaintiff had the option of bringing "complex" cases for an accounting in equity or at law even though the
claims underlying the demand for an accounting were strictly legaP' It is crucial to realize why the "complex" accounting cases
were permitted to be brought in equity if the plaintiff so chose.
Recourse to equity was not based upon a notion that they were
too difficult for juries.S Rather, "the whole machinery of Courts
of Equity [was] better adapted to the purpose of an account."S8
Blackstone went even further, stating that the existence of law
and equity's concurrent jurisdiction in the accounting cases was
solely due to equity's power to order discovery. S7 At any rate, the
fact that the accounting cases could be brought in equity did not
imply that jury incompetence was the reason for permitting the
!)

34. In some cases the plaintiff had to proceed at law, there being no equity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831) (lessor's action for an
accounting of rent allegedly due had to be brought at law). When the underlying claims
were equitable, equity jurisdiction was exclusive. See, e.g., Newberry v. Wilkinson, 199 F.
673 (9th Cir. 1912) (suit for accounting against administratrix of a decedent's estate);
Miller v. Weiant, 42 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (action to compel directors to account
for corporate assets); Williams v. Collier, 38 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (suit by trustee
in bankruptcy to void fraudulent transfer and impose a constructive trust).
The third group of cases afforded plaintiff the option of whether to proceed at law or
in equity, even though the underlying claims were legal in nature. Plaintiff's ability to
proceed in equity was based upon the complexity of the accounts between the parties.
See, e.g., Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887); Fowle v. Lawrason, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831); H.B. Zachry Co. v. Terry, 195 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1952); McNair
v. Burt, 68 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1934); Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d
891 (D. Kan. 1928), aff'd on other grounds, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931).
35. In the common law action of account the jury did not perform the actual accounting function. The jury would render a verdict that the defendant was obligated to
account, at which point a court appointed auditor would settle the accounts between the
parties. The jury would simply resolve disputed issues of fact arising before the auditor.
Similarly, when equity took jurisdiction, a master would be appointed to perform the
accounting function. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); 2 J. STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 587, 590 at 5, 6 & 8 (14 ed. 1918).
36. 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 591 at 9 (14 ed. 1918).
37. "But, for want of this discovery at law, the courts of equity have acquired a
concurrent jurisdiction with every court in all matters of account." 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 437 (1768).
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choice.
At no time in history was the line dividing equity
from law altogether-or even largely-the product of a rational choice between issues which were
better suited to court or to jury trial . . . . jury
trial (or court trial) was often merely the tail of
the dog under a system where you had to take the
whole dog.sS

Since the merger of law and equity, the procedural barriers
characteristic of the premerger law courts have been eliminated.
It would seem that this should have eliminated the option of a
plaintiff to proceed in equity or at law in the equitable accounting cases. However, in dictum, the Supreme Court suggested· in
Dairy Queen that the plaintiff may still have the option of
bringing complex accounting cases in equity although with considerably more difficulty than before the law-equity merger; jury
competency being the relevant factor in determining whether an
accounting case is cognizable in equity.89 The question of
whether this option still exists does not appear to have been resolved by any court since the merger. The reason for this is
probably based on the fact that federal courts favor the policy of
giving either party a jury trial l,lpon demand when the case
presents issues so triable.-4O
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the defendants' attempt to analogize USF Litigation to the old
equitable accounting cases was misplaced because it attempted
to characterize the US]~ cases as a whole rather than character38. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 661-62 (1963)
(footnotes omitted).
39.
[I)n order to maintain such a suit on a cause of action cognizable at law .•. the plaintiff must be able to show that the "accounts between the parties" are of such a "complicated nature" that only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel
them.
In view of the powers given to District Courts by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 53(b) to appoint masters to assist the jury
in these exceptional cases where the legal issues are too complicated for the jury adequately to handle alone, the burden of
such a showing is considerably increased and it will indeed be
a rare case in which it can be met.
369 U.S. at 478 (footnotes omitted).
40. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.7, at 377 (1977). See, e.g., Simler v.
Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
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ize each issue. There is no doubt that the Beacon Theatres/
Dairy Queen holding stated the general rule that the character
of the issue and not the overall action is what controls. The
Ninth Circuit declined, however, to deal specifically with the
fact that the accounting cases were cognizable in equity based
upon the "complexity" of the overall case.
Although the Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on the factors
which distinguished USF Litigation from the historic equitable
accounting cases, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the analogy
was unsound was correct for several reasons. First, given the
present uncertainty of a plaintiff's ability to bring an action for
an equitable accounting when the underlying claims are legal,
the Ninth Circuit was warranted on this basis alone in not finding the equitable accounting case analogous, as USF Litigation
did not involve an action for an accounting; and even the Dairy
Queen dictum only referred to accounting cases. Secondly, and
perhaps more importantly, even if the accounting cases could be
found to parallel USF Litigation, it is still clear that the plaintiffs in USF Litigation would have been entitled to the jury trial
they demanded as the plaintiff in the old equitable accounting
cases had the option of having trial by jury.
The final question to be resolved under the defendants' first
argument is whether "complexity" is a basis for equity jurisdiction in non-accounting cases where legal rights are' asserted and
legal remedies sought. The answer is no.41 "[M]ere complication
41. In United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906), the United States
sought relief in equity for the alleged removal and sale of a large amount of timber by
means of an intricate conspiracy. The United States invoked equity jurisdiction because
"by reason of the frauds and conspiracies. . • and the complications which have resulted
therefrom, no plain, adequate, and complete remedy can be given .•. at law ...•" ld.
at 462. However, the Court held that the case was not cognizable in equity:
The principal ground upon which it is claimed that the remedy at law is inadequate is really nothing more than a difficulty in proving the case against the defendants. The bill
shows that whatever was done in the way of cutting the timber
and carrying it away was done by the defendants as tort
feasors and the various devices alleged to have been resorted
to by the deceased, Daly, by way of organizing different corporations, in order to, as alleged, cover up his tracks, and to
render it more difficult for the complainant to make proof of
his action, does not in the least tend to give a court of equity
jurisdiction on that account. It is simply a question of evidence to show who did the wrong and upon that point the fact
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of facts alone and difficulty of proof are not a basis of equity
jurisidiction. "42
Thus, the defendants' contention that USF Litigation was
analogous to the old E~quitable accounting cases was without
merit. Had the Ninth Circuit accepted this argument, it would
have been tantamount to finding that there is a "complexity exception" to the seventh amendment. Non-accounting cases
which present legal issues and legal remedies are simply not triable in equity based upon the notion that there is no adequate
remedy at law.
Ross v. Bernhard-A Functional Interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment?
The second argument offered by the defendants in USF Litigation as a basis for filtlding that there is no right to a jury trial
in complex cases was specifically based upon the Ross footnote. 4s
Under this approach, Ross was claimed to establish a new functional test for when a litigant has a constitutional right to a jury
trial. Thus, defendants claimed that the historical test has been
abandoned in favor of a new test whereby the practical abilities
and limitations of a jury are an additional factor to be considered in seventh amendment analysis.44
The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that Ross established
a new standard governing seventh amendment analysis, and
gave several reasons why Ross should not be so construed. First,
the Ninth Circuit stated that the Ross test was -only dictum and
thus not binding on federal courts. Undoubtedly, this assessment of the Ross test was correct. The Supreme Court did not
even consider the practical abilities and limitations of jurors in
reaching a decision in the Ross case itself. That is, the Supreme
Court did not apply the third prong of this purported new test
could be ascertained as readily at law as in equity.
Id. at 472-73.
42. Curriden v Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914), alf'g, United States v. Bitter
Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906).
43. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
44. This view of the Ross test was adopted in In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation,
420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976), in which the Court was "of the opinion that the
third part to footnote 10 in Ross v. Bernhard is of constitutional dimensions. It must be
seen as a limitation to or interpretation of the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 105 (citation
omitted).
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in its analysis of the seventh amendment question in Ross.45
Secondly, as the Ninth Circuit stated, the Supreme Court
would certainly not attempt to change the standard for constitu~
tional analysis in a footnote. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the historical test, having been applied throughout almost the
entire history of the seventh amendment, would hardly be discarded without some type of reasoned analysis or cited authority
supporting a new functional interpretation of the seventh
amendment. There was neither in the Ross opinion.46
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly construed Ross as not
intending an alteration of the seventh amendment right to trial
by jury, the court incorrectly assessed the variance between the
historical test and the purported new Ross test. The Ninth Cir- .
cuit stated that application of the Ross test "would necessitate
an examination of the whole case. "47 The Ninth Circuit believed
that under the Ross test the whole case would have to be characterized as legal or equitable and thus application of the Ross test
would be inconsistent with prior seventh amendment analysis
which has always been based on the nature of the issue to be
tried. 48
However, application of the Ross test would not require a
characterization of the overall case and, indeed, Ross prohibited
such a characterization. Had Ross actually stated a new consti45. In Ross the question of jury competence was raised at every level. The district
court had found that the jury was competent to deal with the issues. The appellate court
questioned the jury's ability to resolve derivative suits "because of the exceedingly complex nature of many of these actions" but then stated that "the Seventh Amendment
does not ask that we assess the suitability of a given type of litigation for jury trial." See
Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 403
F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). However, the
Supreme Court considered the claims asserted in Ross and found them to be "legal"
without any mention of a jury's abilities to understand the issues. Implicit in this failure
to consider the jury's competence in dealing with the complex issues presented by the
Ross litigation was that the Supreme Court did not intend that jury competency be a
factor in dealing with seventh amendment questions.
46. "[T]he footnote is so cursory, conclusory and devoid of cited authority or reasoned analysis that it is difficult to believe it could have been intended to reject such
established historical practice or Supreme Court precedent." Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision-Making, 70
Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 526 (1975).
47. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 426 (9th Cir. 1979).
48.Id.
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tutional standard governing seventh amendment questions, that
standard would still have required that each issue be evaluated
in terms of the three factors comprising the Ross test. The sentence explained by the footnote stated that "[t]he Seventh
Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be
tried rather than the character of the overall action."49 Thus, the
question would be whether a given issue, otherwise legal, is beyond the practical abilities and limitations of a jury.
Although the Ross test is consistent with the historical test
insofar as characterization is to be based upon the nature of the
issue, there are major problems inherent in its application. The
Ross Court gave no guidance as to whether the test is to be applied on a case by case basis or whether it is to be applied on a
generic basis. Application on a case by case basis would require a
court to characterize an issue as being beyond the jury's capabilities in each case. AplPlication on a generic basis would require
that a certain type of issue be generally characterized as beyond
the capabilities of a jury.
Application of either method of characterizing an issue immediately leads to the problem of ascertaining the proper standards to be applied. VVhen is an issue beyond the practical abilities and limitations of a jury? Characterization on a case by case
basis would force courts to speculate before trial as to whether
an issue is going to be too complex for jury resolution. This
would lead to a great deal of inconsistency from case to case. A
right guaranteed by the Constitution should not "be dependent
upon the exercise of such a broad discretionary power by federal
court judges.lSo Indeec:il, one of the major purposes of the seventh
amendment was to protect litigants from such an arbitrary exercise of power by federal court judges.lSl Much the same problem
exists with a generic approach to characterizing an issue. Again,
the problem lies in a'3certaining what standard is to be applied.
For example, are antitrust claims generally too complex for reso49. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970).
50. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 644 (the Ross test raises "the spectre of federal
judges using a disturbingly broad discretion in their determination of whether a jury
ought to be interposed in particular cases.").
51. For an excellent discussion of the seventh amendment's historical background,
see Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639 (1973).
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lution by a jury whereas tax claims are not? Where is the line to
be drawn? The Supreme Court has never addressed, let alone
resolved, any of these problems iriherent in an attempt to apply
the purported new Ross test governing seventh amendment
analysis.
.
Finally, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the Supreme Court
has addressed seventh amendment questions in depth on five occasions since the Ross decision. Each case was decided on the
basis of the traditional historical test. 1S2 In none of these cases
was there any mention of the Ross test or jury competence as
being relevant in resolving the seventh amendment questions
presented. Had the Supreme Court intended the Ross test to be
of "constitutional dimensions" it most certainly would have applied the test in these later cases and perhaps resolved some of
the problems inherent in any attempt to apply it.
It is not clear what the Supreme Court meant by the inclusion of the controversial footnote in the Ross opinion. However,
the Ninth Circuit was justified in concluding that the Supreme
Court did not intend that it be a new functional interpretation
of the seventh amendment whereby there is some sort of complexity exception to the right to trial by jury.

Jury Trial-A Violation of Due Process in Complex Cases?
The final argument proffered by the defendants was based
upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The defendants claimed that because of the complexity of USF Litigation,
a jury could not make a rational decision and thus due process
would be violated by permitting an incompetent fact-finder to
render an irrational verdict. ISS The Ninth Circuit rejected this ar52. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.s. 189, 194 (1974) ("[t]he Seventh Amendment •.•
requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."); Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974) (seventh amendment "requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies
of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action in equity or
admiralty."). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (historical test
applied without any mention of abilities of juries or the Ross dictum); Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1978) (holding based on statutory grounds), af/'g 416 U.S. 363; Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 449 af/'g 416 U.S. 363 (1977).
53. The court in In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash.
1976), adopted this view as an alternative basis for striking the jury demands in that
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gument, simply stating that a jury is not incompetent to decide
complex cases. The Ninth Circuit refused to "accept the underlying premise of [defendants'] argument, 'that a single judge is
bright~r than the jurors collectively functioning together.' "54
Furthermore, "[w]hetb.er a case is tried to a jury or to a judge,
the taSk of the attorney remains the same. The attorney must
organize and assemblH a complex mass of information into a
form which is understandable to the uninitiated."IHI

Cases-As Complex as They First Appear?
Although not the basis of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of
the defendants' due process argument, the Ninth Circuit discussed the many pretrial occurrences and procedural mechanisms by which cases, originally appearing overwhelmingly complicated, are simplified before they ever reach the jury.
A motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 may be used to
test the sufficiency of an adversary's pleadings.
The facts may become sufficiently clear on some
issues to entitle a party to have judgment entered
as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The
parties may stipulate to the admissibility of evidence, or to the facts themselves, thus reducing
the time necessary to present a case at trial. The
trial court could also order separate trials on some
of the claims or issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
And, . . . many cases or issues may be settled
prior to trial. &6

Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) empowers a
case. The Boise court stated that trial by court was necessary "for the appearance and
fact of fairness." Id. at 105.
54. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting
Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial
Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 53 (1977».
The Ninth Circuit also stated that had it been necessary to resolve the question of
jury competency under the fust two arguments propounded by the defendants, the court
would have resolved the question the same way it did under defendants' due process
claim. Implicit in this is that the Ninth Circuit would refuse to uphold the former option
of a plaintiff to bring an action for an equitable accounting when the underlying claims
are legal in nature. Furthermore, had the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Ross test was
intended to be of constitutional dimension, the Ninth Circuit would simply have held
that no case (or issue) is too complex for jury resolution, and would in effect continue to
adhere to the traditional historical test.
55. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 428 (9th Cir. 1979).
56. Id. at 428 (footnotel1 omitted).
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judge to appoint a master to assist the jury with complicated
issues,5'7 and Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 permits the use of
summaries of voluminous material in order to simplify the evidence presented at trial. 58
Although the Ninth Circuit discussed all these considerations by which complex cases may be simplified for jury resolution, they were not the basis for the Ninth Circuit's rejection of
the defendants' due process argument in USF Litigation, because the Ninth Circuit ruled "that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial in even the most complex cases at law
"59

The defendants' due process argument was rejected by the
Ninth Circuit on the ground that "a jury is a competent factfinder in complex cases."60 Thus, there is no due process exception to the seventh amendment. The Ninth Circuit did "not believe any case is so overwhelmingly complex that it is beyond the
abilities of a jury."61 "Jurors, if properly instructed and treated
with deserved respect, bring collective intelligence, wisdom, and
dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equalled in other areas
of public service. "62
To a large extent, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the due
process contention was based upon the Court's own confidence
in the jury system. The Ninth Circuit ackowledged, there has
been little substantive research conducted dealing with the practical abilities of jurors.68
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b), construed in In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d
at 428.
58. FED. R. Evm. 1006, construed in In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d at
428.
Furthermore, the Manual for Complex Litigation, developed by the Federal Judicial
Center, providea various 8uggestions as to how the federal district court judge can manage and direct complex litigation. The Manual specifie8 that the trial judge must not
infringe a litigant'8 right to trial by jury. "Caution: Make 8ure that the requirements for
jury trial enunciated in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, or Ross v. Bernhard, are not
violated in ordering trial of a separate issue." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION 139-40 (1977).
59. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 428 n.58 (9th Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 427.
61. Id. at 432.
62. Id. at 430.
63. [d.
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However, in the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in USF Litigation, the court did note the procedural devices available to the
federal courts which, in effect, render the due process claim
without foundation. 64 In any trial where a verdict has been returned against the w«~ight of the evidence, where damages are
unreasonably high, or where the trial was unfair for some reason,
the trial judge has the power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 to grant a new trial. 61i Also, a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 where there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict.66 These procedural safeguards protect litigants from the
possibility of an "irrational verdict" in any trial.
In view of the fact that the jury system has been part of
American jurisprudence for its entire history, it would certainly
be highly questionable for the Ninth Circuit to suddenly assert
that trial by jury may violate a litigant's right to due process of
law, particularly in light of the fact that a litigant who does demand trial by jury is guaranteed the right by the seventh
amendment. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was completely justified in
concluding that the fifth amendment due process' clause does
not provide a "complexity exception" to the seventh amendment
right to trial by jury.

D.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was clearly warranted in rejecting the defendants' effort to deny the plaintiffs
their seventh amendment right to trial by jury. Adoption of any
one of the three theories advanced by the defendants would
have had the effect of establishing some sort of "complexity exception" to the seventh amendment guarantee. Adoption of any
one of the three theories would require trial judges to make a
speculative and discretionary decision as to when a case is going
to be "beyond the practical abilities and limitations of juries"
and, as a result, whell a litigant has a constitutional right to trial
by jury. A constitutional right should not be relegated to such a
64. Id. at 432.

65. Id. (construing FED. R. ClY. P. 59).
66. Id. (construing FED. R. ClY. P. 50); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th

Cir. 1978) (judgment n.o.v. may be granted when "the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.").
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position in light of contrary Supreme Court precedent and the
fact that the seventh amendment was intended to protect litigants from just that type of discretionary power in the hands of
federal court judges.

Curtis E. Blystone*

v.

OTHER
LAW

DEVELOPMENTS

IN

CONSTITUTIONAL

In Zaslowsky v. Board of Education, 610 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
Dec., 1979), public schoolteachers alleged that a desegregation
plan requiring that the racial and ethnic makeup of teachers at
each school in the district reflect the racial and ethnic makeup
of teachers in the district as a whole violated their equal protection rights. The plan was instituted as a result of notification
from the Office of Civil Rights that a previously instituted plan
did not comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The plan called for the involuntary transfer of several hundred
teachers. Plaintiffs based their equal protection argument on the
fact that the plan took race into accou,nt. ()
Relying on United States v. Montgomery County Board of
Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969) and its progeny, the court ruled
that in assigning teachers, a school district need not be "color
blind." The court also stated that race-conscious plans are valid
even in the absence of de jure segregation. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265, 352 (1978); United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); McDaniel v.
Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). The court also noted the Supreme
Court's approval of the adoption of prescribed ratios by a school
board in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
In Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 612 F.2d 411
(9th Cir. Nov., 1979), plaintiffs alleged that the school district
maintained racially imbalanced schools. The district court found
that the schools were indeed segregated as a result of the distri<;:t's acts, but that the school district did not act with "segre* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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gative intent," because it had followed a race neutral "neighborhood school policy." The district court held that a strict
adherence to such a policy was sufficient to dispell inferences of
segregative intent that arose from plaintiffs' evidence.
The Ninth Circuit held that evidence of even the strictest
adherence to a neighborhood policy is not determinative of the
absence of a forbidden purpose. The court pointed out that
under such a policy of building schools in a racially segregated
neighborhood could be motivated by a discriminatory intent.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1, 20-21. The court remanded the case for further factual
determinations.
In United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. April,
1980), defendants argued that state statutes prohibiting carnal
knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen years violated
equal protection guarlmtees in that it established an impermissible gender based classification. Under the statute, only male
participants were punishable. Although admitting that the statute classified according to gender, the government argued that
only males could be perpetrators, and only females victims, of
the crime of carnal knowledge.
Relying on Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the court of
appeals held that in order to survive attack, a statute which
classifies according to gender must serve an imporant governmental purpose and must be substantially related to the
achievement of that purpose. The government asserted that the
statute furthered the goals of preventing teenage pregnancies
and injuries to young women. The government's only evidence
on the relationship between the purpose and the penalties were
the assertions that "only women could get pregnant," and that
"there seems to be evidence that women are far more likely to
suffer physical damage" than men of the same age. The government produced no evidence that suggested punishing only males
furthered either purpose.
The court held that by failing to produce any such evidence,
the government failed to meet its burden of proving a substantial relation between the stated goals and the gender based assignment of the roles of "victim" and "perpetrator."
In Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. April, 1980), the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Hawaii's mental
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heath laws. Plaintiff argued that a statute which allows for the
involuntary commitment of a person who is "mentally ill . . .
and is dangerous to property" but not necessarily to himself or
other persons was an unconstitutional curtailment of civilliberties. Noting that the statute allowed commitment of any person
"inflicting, attempting or threatening imminently to inflict damage to any property," the court of appeals agreed. The court
cited Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) for the rule
that a state may not involuntarily commit a person unless the
potential of that person doing harm to himself or others justifies
such a curtailment of liberty. The court also cited Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) for the rule that the individual's liberty interest must be heavily weighed against society's interest
to determine if a commitment statute is valid. The court hypothesized that under Hawaii's statute, a person could be involuntarily committed for threatening to shoot a neighbor'S dog
that had strayed on his property. The court held that society's
interest in' protecting any property did not outweigh the individual's liberty interest.
Hawaii's statute also permitted involuntary commitment for
a "diagnostic examination and evaluation" of a person who refuses to submit to such an examination by a 'physician and "there
is sufficient evidence to believe that the allegations of the [commitment] petition are true." The district court held this provision violated the patient's fifth amendment right to remain silent. Finding that the statute imposed incarceration because the
patient is dangerous, and not as punishment for refusing to talk,
and noting that evidence that the patient is dangerous is also
required by the statute, the court held that this portion of the
statute was valid under the Constitution. The court relied on
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), which upheld a
prison disciplinary procedure whereby a prisoner's refusal to
speak could be used as evidence against him because under the
regulation such a refusal, standing alone, was not sufficient evidence to penalize the prisoner. The court also stated that if the
district court's decision were upheld, any subject of a commitment petition could avoid commitment simply by remaining
silent.
The court of appeals also considered the constitutionality of
a state statute which allowed involuntary commitment of a person who is "dangerous" but did not require the danger to be
, imminent or substantial, The court struck down this portion of
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the statute as a violation of the holding in Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.n. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on
remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.n. Wis.), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1818 (E.n. Wis. 1976), "[t]hat the proper
standard is that which requires a finding of im'minent and substantial danger as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or
threat." 438 F. Supp. at 1110.
The court of appElals also reversed the district court holding
that the need for the five day evaluation confinement be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on Addington
which rejected the argument that the need for civil commitment
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and held that the proof
must ~e greater than that required in other types of civil suits.
In Clark v. Chasen, 619 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. May, 1980),
plaintiff, a female employee of the United States CuStoms Service, filed a formal complaint with the Customs Service alleging
that she was treated differently than the man who had previously held her position. She later left the Service and filed a disability claim based on an inability to continue working. The Service informed plaintiJ!f that it had tentatively found that her
employment discrimination charge was unfounded, and that she
had a right to a hearing at which she could be represented by
counsel. Immediately prior to the scheduled hearing, the plaintiff requested a continuance. This request was denied. Plaintiff
thereafter refused to take part in the hearing, and her complaint
was cancelled for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff then brought suit
in federal district COUlrt. This action was dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrativ·e remedies.
The court examined the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (the Act) and discovered that
the Act was passed in an attempt to correct what Congress perceived as an "abysmal record in [governmental] minority employment," and past failures to deal administratively with discrimination claims by federal employees. The court found that
Congress wished to change the practice of giving each federal
agency the power to police its own employment practices.
Citing Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976), the
court noted that the Act provided for a trial de novo in federal
court for those who had employment discrimination complaints
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arising in private employment. The Clark panel held that there
was no reason why federal employees should be more heavily
burdened than private employees in bringing discrimination
suits, and cited Grubbs. v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
which held that the legislative intent would be frustrated by requiring federal employees, but not private employees, to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing suit under the Act. The
court therefore reversed the district court, and remanded for a
trial de novo in the district court, noting that the administrative
record could be admitted as evidence at the new trial.
In In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. June,
1980), the court considered whether the rule in California that
punitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions violates the equal protection clause. The case arose out of an airplane crash. Several of the wrongful death actions brought
against the airline company included claims for punitive damages. The wrongful death actions were consolidated and transferred to the federal district court in California, and it was determined that California law would apply. The district court
held that although California courts of appeal have held that punitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions under
California law, such a rule violates equal protection guarantees
of both the state and federal constitutions because it establishes
an improper distinction between plaintiffs in wrongful death
suits and those bringing other tort actions. Defendants appealed,
and the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The court first considered whether the California rule violates the federal equal protection clause. Relying on Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), the
court of appeals held that the relationship between the governmental purpose of limiting liability and the class established by
the California rule was rational, and that under the Constitution
no greater relationship was required. The court specifically refused to apply a middle-tier analysis.
In rejecting plaintiff's claim that the California rule violated
the California Constitution, the court distinguished Cooper v.
Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978),
and Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388 (1975), on the ground that those cases denied a large class of
people any recovery whatsoever. The court pointed out that
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under the California rule, substantial compensatory damages
were available in wrongful death cases.
The court also rejected the district court's holding that a
state rule which allows punitive damages for injuries to property
while disallowing such damages under the state constitution because the "classification ... advance[s] a discernible purpose in
a rational manner."
In California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. May, 1980) (en banc), the court
considered the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-442,451-455 (1976)
(amended 1976 & 1980) (the Act). Plaintiffs, the California Medical Association and its political committee affiliate, argued that
the Act's limitations on contributions by the medical association
to its affiliate was an infringement on their first amendment
rights to speech and political expression. Plaintiffs also argued
that the requirement that support given by the medical association to a multicandidate political committee must be counted toward the dollar limit on such contributions, even though contributions by labor unions and corporations were not so limited,
was unconstitutional. The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs'
claims.
The court found the limitations imposed by the Act on the
right of association minimal. The court pointed out that the Act
did not limit in any way the medical association's right to collect
and expend money or efforts to elect any particular candidate.
The Act does not limit efforts to directly influence others to vote
for particular candidates, but only limits the amounts that can
be given to a multicandidate political committee. The court relied on Buckley v. ,raleo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and
First National Banh v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), for the
proposition that restrictions on contributions to multicandidate
committees were consistent with the Constitution. The court
noted that contributions to such committees constitute "potential speech dependent upon the recipient for its ultimate articulation," and limitations on such "potential speech" do not "significantly diminish the effectiveness or the quantity of political
speech." The court stated that because the intrusion by the Act
on the right to political speech was slight, only the absence of a
"discernible, important, and legitimate policy of the Congress"
could result in a finding of unconstitutionality. See Buckley.
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The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the California Medical Association was more limited in their right to political expression than were corporations and labor unions, pointing
out that corporations and labor unions are flatly prohibited from
directly spending money to influence federal elections.
Dissenting, Judges Choy and Hug argued that the Act was
unconstitutional as to its treatment of unincorporated associations.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Wallace stated that
the restriction on contributions to a campaign committee were
sustainable under the first amendment only if 1) the government's interest were greater than the group and individual interests in freedom of speech and association, and 2) the restriction
and unincorporated associations but not labor unions and corporations were "closely tailored" to achieve a stated governmental
interest. Judge Wallace would have held that the Act places "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity" of the associations "political speech" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at
39), and that substantial and impermissable restraints were
placed on the association member's. freedom of association.
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